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A. WHY STUDY DOMESTIC DRUG POLICY? 
1. Major Research Question 
How has U.S. domestic drug policy affected U.S. foreign policy in Latin 
America? Since the Nixon era, when the U.S. declared a “war on drugs,” it has 
continually pursued a supply-side policy that has tried, and failed, to reduce or eliminate 
the use of illicit drugs within the country. It is by no means obvious how carefully foreign 
policy considerations were taken into account in framing this policy. Yet its impact on 
America’s relations with its southern neighbors has been, and remains, profound. 
What does the continuation of America’s current policies mean for its future 
relationships in Latin America? Conversely, to what extent might currently familiar and 
entrenched relationships and international interaction with Latin America, created by the 
war on drugs itself, stand in the way of a change in policy?  
Domestically, support for decriminalized drug policies have begun to make 
themselves felt. Some American states have recognized that decriminalization and 
legalization may be an alternative answer to the unending war on drugs. If U.S. domestic 
policy continues to shift toward a more liberal stance, how might this affect the U.S.’s 
relationships in Latin America? 
2. Importance  
The politically destabilizing effects of drugs in producing states is owed to the 
fact that the drugs are illegal where they are consumed, a circumstance that drives up 
prices and profits sufficiently to support major criminal enterprises. If these situations 
change, one can expect a great deal else to change. From civil wars to agricultural 
disaster, U.S. policy directly affects Latin American economies, politics, and social 
welfare. The U.S. has poured funding and military aid, into parts of Latin America, for 
instance in the form of Plan Colombia. Distorted success in certain areas gives way to 
measured failure in the surrounding region (the balloon effect saw Peru’s cocaine 
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production skyrocket as production fell in Colombia), enriching narco-terrorists and other 
armed groups, thereby undermining Latin American developmental progress overall.1 
The drug trade feeds the criminal elements of society and undermines social governance 
and public welfare efforts through corruption, violence, and other mechanisms. A U.S. 
shift towards domestic decriminalization and legalization could create a commodity 
industry in Latin America that would allow a legal means for lower classes to pursue 
income and present a new legal income stream (via taxation) to support the social, 
political, and structural development of Latin America. 
3. Problems and Hypotheses 
It may be hard to quantify the effects of U.S. domestic drug policy on our 
relations with Latin America. However, multiple works have broached this subject. Even 
absent overall success, the war on drugs has produced a range of institutional 
beneficiaries in Latin America, and there is an argument to be made that the region has 
benefited from increased American engagement (and aid) that the war on drugs has 
inspired.  
There is also a vast infrastructure of anti-drug institutions throughout the U.S., 
from antinarcotic U.S. military units to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to 
the narcotics divisions within local police departments, the existence of which are 
dependent on the war on drugs. U.S. agencies have established working relationships 
with sister agencies in Latin America, and therefore it may be difficult for these agencies 
to see anything other than the positive effects of international cooperation between the 
U.S. and Latin America. What would become of these groups if the U.S. government 
decriminalized or legalized drugs? The status-quo could have created ingrained 
international interrelationships between counter-drug agencies that may resist a change of 
policy.  
It is difficult to forecast the outcome of drug legalization on a federal level 
because it has not occurred in the U.S. That said, some Latin American countries are in 
                                                 
1 Narco-terrorism is terrorism financed by profits from illegal drug trafficking. Merriam Webster 
Online, s.v. “narco-terrorism,” accessed: May 26, 2014. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
narco-terrorism. 
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the beginning stages of drug legalization. It will be interesting to see if and how these 
governments will capitalize on the new market, and how the legalization of drugs in 
producer states may affect their willingness to cooperate with the United States in the 
suppression of the international drug trade. Perhaps researchers and U.S. society can use 
the success or failure in the narco-legalized Latin American states as a metric to predict 
U.S. success along a similar path. This may also help determine the likely ramifications a 
U.S. domestic drug policy change may have in U.S. relations with Latin America. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
There exists a large repository of literature on drugs; however, this literature 
review focuses on the most important and influential of these texts. This section discusses 
what some of these works have in common, where they diverge, and what the current 
literature ignores. The first subsection examines the mindset of policy makers by 
reviewing Congressional Hearings that discuss the drug-policy reform issue. This 
literature review also examines the following works: Drug War Heresies by Robert J. 
MacCoun and Peter Reuter; The Mission by Dana Priest; Drug Crazy by Mike Gray; 
Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, by Coletta A. 
Youngers and Eileen Rosin; a hearing before Congress titled “Overview of U.S. Policy 
Toward The Western Hemisphere;” Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial by Eva 
Bertram, Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe, and Peter Andreas; and “The Economics of 
the Drug War: Effective Federal Policy or Missed Opportunity?” by Marvin H. McGuire 
and Steven M. Carroll. The final subsection will comprise a critique of the selected 
literature and explain what contributions this thesis attempts to infuse into the current 
debate regarding U.S. drug policy reform. There is a strong argument, which states that 
the U.S. “War on Drugs” has failed; however, there is no agreement as to why the U.S. 
continues to pursue this failed policy. Some authors cite moral or social reason for a lack 
of policy change—few scholars pursue a causal analysis to explain U.S. policy 
continuity. Ultimately, this research indicates that U.S. drug policy generally has adverse 
effects in Latin America.  
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2. Current Policy Perspective 
In 1999, the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources, Committee on Government Reform held a hearing chaired by the Honorable 
John L. Mica. This hearing discussed and was titled the Pros and Cons of Drug 
Legalization, Decriminalization, and Harm Reduction. Mr. Mica explained that this was 
an important hearing because “the American public should understand the policy 
implications of legalization, decriminalization and harm reduction. They need to hear 
both sides of this debate that is why we begin today, hopefully, in a civil and well-
informed discussion.”2 Mr. Mica advocated that although some are driving for 
legalization and decriminalization, since the late 1970s, U.S. drug policy had been 
successful. He explains that from 1979 to 1992, U.S. drug users dropped by 50 percent 
and cocaine use alone dropped by 75 percent between 1985 and 1992.3 Mr. Mica notes 
that with such success, an attempt to change policy would serve only as a step backwards 
in the war on drugs.  
Also present at this hearing, Representative Benjamin Gilman explained, 
“Legalization is virtually a surrender to despair. It cannot and should not be any topic of 
serious discussion in our Nation’s debate on the challenges of illicit drugs.” Mr. Gilman 
viewed such debate as a vehicle to send mixed and confusing messages to our youth. Mr. 
Gilman expands on Mr. Mica’s comments and explains that with a cocaine usage 
reduction of nearly 80 percent over a seven-year period, current U.S. policy coupled with 
a fervent “public relations campaign, through Mrs. Reagan’s Just Say No theme,” is the 
best way to make progress in the war on drugs. The debate began in the late 1990s, and 
faced stringent opposition from policy makers; however, Congress asserts it was trying to 
approach the debate with an even hand. 
At this June hearing before Congress, General Barry R. McCaffrey explained that 
State initiatives for policy change where welcome and a federal right. General 
                                                 
2 Pros and Cons of Drug Legalization, Decriminalization, and Harm Reduction: Hearings on H.R. 
10699, Day 1, Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 106th 
Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of John L. Mica, Chairman). 
3 Ibid., 3.   
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McCaffrey, a strong opponent of legalization, expressed that he did not intend to stifle 
any legal approach to change. That said, he expressed that some legalization and 
decriminalization advocates “have disguised themselves under other terms to advance 
their argument.”4 If one seeks change, let them be honest and open about their methods, 
intentions, and goals.  General McCaffrey stated forthrightly that his anti-drug media 
campaigns goal was to “affect youth attitudes to reject the abuse of drugs.”5 He goes on 
to explain that despite the efforts of the “drug legalization people,” they simply cannot 
compete with the power that the U.S. Government has “brought to bear on this issue.”6 
The General felt confident that no one would be “stupid enough” to put “a drug 
legalization initiative on the table.”7  He explains that the proponents of legalization often 
take indirect and beguiling routes to try to spark change, for instance, medical pot and 
industrial hemp legalization. General McCaffrey saw these actions as dishonest and 
misleading and believed that his media campaign would eventually affect youth attitudes 
in such a way to prevent future drug use. 
Congressional and U.S. leadership approaches to drug policy in this hearing 
portend a strong prohibitive approach in future U.S. drug policy. General McCaffrey later 
states, when addressing Congress:  
I want you to understand; don’t think I’ve got an open mind. I am not—
after 3 ½ years of going to drug treatment centers around America and 
listening to 14-year-old girls who are addicted to heroin and listening to 
their parents talk about it and just having come yesterday from New 
Orleans, from a Baptist church-based drug treatment center, I am not open 
minded about drug abuse in America. I think it is a crime. … It [leaves] 
more people dead each year than in the Vietnam War that shattered my 
generation. I think it is crazy, and I think most Americans feel the same 
way. We have to put it out to the public. We have to rediscover why we 
are opposed to a drugged, dazed life-style for our children, our fellow 
workers and our families.8 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 32. 
5 Ibid., 95. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 103. 
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The following month in July 1999, Congress met to further the discussion on the 
decriminalization of illegal drugs. Mr. Mica explained that upon examining the effect of 
illegal drugs, they clearly destroy lives. He furthers, “they help produce the felonious 
behavior and conduct we have seen: overdoses, fatal accidents, and death by criminal 
homicide.”9  Legalization would serve only to exacerbate the situation. In agreement, 
former Drug Enforcement Administration Administrator and 39-year law enforcement 
veteran, Thomas A. Constantine likened drug legalization and decriminalization to 
allowing other socially deviant behavior. Mr. Constantine states decriminalizing illicit 
drugs, 
would be similar to deciding how much domestic violence we would 
tolerate, how much drunken driving we would tolerate, how much child 
abuse we would tolerate, and we would wind up compromising positions 
on the edges of the argument, and the eventual losers would be the young 
people of the United States.10 
To round-off the avocation for prohibitive drug policies, the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform heard the testimony of the mother of a drug victim and President of Drug Watch 
International, Sandra Bennett. Ms. Bennett explains that despite years of research 
explaining the detriment that illicit drugs cause to the mind, body, and soul, and on 
society, that she is surprised Congress “is being forced to debate this insanity [drug 
legalization/decriminalization].”11 Ms. Bennett goes on to reiterate the failure of the 
1970’s permissive drug policies and the social woes it fostered. She follows with a 
compelling argument. Ms. Bennett states that:  
Decriminalization, as embraced by the drug culture, is simply the notion 
that those who use illicit drugs are blameless and that all criminal legal 
sanctions against use should be removed. As a bereaved parent, I can tell 
you that I would rather my son be shaken to his senses with a little jail 
time than have to lose him, have him lose his life or lead a useless, 
                                                 
9 The Decriminalization of Illegal Drugs: Hearings on H.R. 106115, Day 1, Before the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 106th Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of John L. 
Mica, Chairman). 
10 Ibid., 7. 
11 Ibid., 93. 
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debilitated one. Decriminalization is actually part of a back door effort to 
ease society into accepting legalization of all psychoactive and addictive 
drugs. … Perception of consequences or danger is key. When drug users 
suffer no consequences, the behavior appears safe, acceptable, and spreads 
unchecked, friend to friend, sibling to sibling, parent to child.12  
As compelling as these arguments are, there are areas of the argument that Congress and 
policy makers fail to examine, the impact of U.S. policies throughout the Western 
Hemisphere. Drug addiction and the drug trade is not only a domestic concern, it affects 
the entire world, and especially our neighbor to the south who are drug-producing 
nations. In order to alleviate the global drug problem one must examine the effects of the 
drug trade at a global scale. Current U.S. policies prevent this from occurring. The 
following sections examine current literature on U.S. drug policy change. 
3. Consensus  
One common thread throughout all of the works listed in the introduction, with 
the exception of the hearings before Congress, is that current U.S. drug policy is 
ineffective and generally failing to serve its intended purpose of ending the harmful 
effects of drugs within the U.S. These authors see policies and their enforcement 
mechanisms as a root cause of the problem. MacCoun and Reuter explain, “America’s 
highly punitive version of prohibition is intrusive, divisive, and expensive and leaves the 
United States with a drug problem that is worse than that of any other wealthy nation.”13 
Gray agrees that U.S. antidrug policies have produced less than satisfactory results, he 
explains: “… there is a growing consensus that it’s time at last to put the prohibitionists 
in the dock, time to demand some justification for a brutal eighty-year conflict that has 
produced the opposite of what was intended.”14 Others agree that the drug war diverts 
U.S. attention and funds away from more pressing domestic security issues. For example, 
McGuire and Carroll argue that despite limited successes: 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 93–95. 
13 Robert J. MacCoun and Peter Reuter, Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times, & 
Places (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1. 
14 Mike Gray, Drug Crazy: How We Got Into This Mess and How We Can Get Out (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 198. 
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little progress has been made to reduce illegal drug use by America’s 
youth, to decrease drug related violence in our cities, or to affect the 
exposure of the non-drug using population to the negative externalities of 
the illegal drug trade.15  
Priest talks of some of the externalities of which U.S. citizens are unaware. She 
devotes a chapter to U.S. supply-side anti-drug policy in Colombia. Plan Colombia, 
initiated in 2000 was an approach to thwart coca production through crop substitution and 
other internal security methods, led by U.S. military components. Priest explains that by 
2002, military leaders “and others at the U.S. embassy had judged [coca crop-
substitution] a failure. … [and] violence in Colombia claimed another 3,000 lives that 
year.”16 All of the listed authors agree that U.S. supply side policies and or domestic 
prohibitionist policies have failed to produce results congruent with their intended effects.  
Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin explain that U.S. prohibitive domestic drug 
policy drives an international policy with the main purpose being to decrease or end the 
supply of illicit drugs inside the U.S. They explain that such policies should increase the 
price of illicit drugs to an extent that it would prohibit demand. In agreement with the 
authors listed above, Youngers and Rosin agree that after “twenty-five years and 25 
billion dollars,” the U.S. has failed to reduce “drug abuse and availability” in the 
country.17 Youngers and Rosin go on to explain that the U.S. has not only failed to 
produce favorable results in the drug war but has, in the process of pursuing a prohibitive 
domestic policy, deteriorated democratic institutions and undercut the economic viability 
of the rural poor in Latin America. Furthermore, Youngers and Rosin assert that U.S. 
drug policy has also led to human rights violations and caused the drug trade to balloon, 
shifting into less controlled areas as the U.S. and its partners focus anti-drug attention on 
particular regions in Latin America.18  
                                                 
15 Marvin H. McGuire and Steven M. Carroll, “The Economics of the Drug War: Effective Federal 
Policy or Missed Opportunity?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002), 1, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a405877.pdf. 
16 Dana Priest, The Mission (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 210. 
17 Colletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of 
U.S. Policy (Washington DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2004), 1. 
18 Ibid., 1–2.  
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The website We are the Drug Policy Alliance (DPA) is also in the “U.S. drug 
policy failure” camp. Like Youngers and Rosin, the DPA observes the collateral effects 
of U.S. policy. Here the website notes the environmental and community damage in Latin 
America, citing coca eradication programs that have an adverse effect on community 
ecosystems. The effects of U.S. policy in Latin America have also created an “upsurge in 
violence, corruption, impunity, erosion of rule of law, and human rights violations caused 
by the emergence of powerful organized crime groups and drug cartels.”19 The DPA 
notes that Latin American leaders are beginning to recognize the harmful side effects of 
U.S. prohibitive drug policy and therefore, they have begun to speak up against such a 
policy.20 
4. Divergence 
While agreeing on current policy failure, the selected authors’ opinions vary on 
the effects of failed policies and on why the U.S. continues to pursue failed policies of 
criminalization at home and failed supply-side policies to reduce drug trafficking abroad. 
McGuire and Carroll are hard pressed to find a viable reason why U.S. policy makers still 
support prohibition. They cite several possible reasons for this from an assumption that 
drug use causes sexual promiscuity, to the belief that adolescents who never use illegal 
drugs will be less likely to become addicts as adults. McGuire and Carroll go on to 
explain that the effects of prohibitionist policies are not only ineffective but also very 
expensive. Therefore, economics plays an important role in McGuire and Carroll’s thesis; 
they believe the current policy’s ultimate intention is to improve the quality of life of 
Americans. The best way to frame an argument is to put it into terms the average person 
can understand; in the case of these two authors, those terms are dollar signs. As such, 
McGuire and Carroll strive “to make recommendations for drug policy change using the  
 
                                                 
19 “Drug Trafficking in Latin America,” We are the Drug Policy Alliance, accessed December 3, 2013, 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-trafficking-latin-america.  
20 “Global Reform,” We are the Drug Policy Alliance, accessed May 24, 2014, 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/global-reform.  
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economic approach to drug legalization.”21 They argue that legalization of illegal drugs is 
a viable alternative to prohibitionist policies that will not only improve the quality of life 
for Americans but it will be economically beneficial.22 
While McGuire and Carroll focus on economics in their approach to correcting 
failed drug policy, Priest presents an interesting case that U.S. military leaders used 
Washington’s failed “War on Drugs” to secure their institution’s future and “open the 
door ever wider for broader military relations [in Latin America].”23 Priest explains that 
the U.S. military leaders first rejected the notion that it should be involved in the U.S. 
“War on Drugs,” they felt domestic policy should focus on ways to diminish the demand 
for drugs. However, in 1989 military involvement in the drug war was unavoidable when 
George H. W. Bush issued National Security Decision Directive 18. The military took the 
lead in trying to pull all drug-war related agencies into a fold of cooperation. Priest 
explains that the drug war provided new opportunities for these agencies to procure 
funding thereby creating competition for jurisdiction and justifying their existence. The 
drug war would go on to justify the U.S. military’s presence and mission in Latin 
America.24 
While the U.S. military may use the drug war to justify its mission set in Latin 
America, many U.S. politicians use the war on drugs as a domestic platform during the 
election season. MacCoun and Reuter explain that U.S. politicians often take a tough 
stance on the “War on Drugs.” There are a few politicians, in these authors estimation, 
that are in favor of drug policy change but endorse arbitrary or minuscule legislation that 
would not pose a great political risk to their careers. MacCoun and Reuter give accounts 
of officials who suggested policy change facing ridicule by contemporaries who subject 
them to a stringent political backlash. This is especially true when proponents raise the  
 
 
                                                 
21 McGuire and Carroll, “Economics of the Drug War,” 20. 
22 Ibid., 18–20. 
23 Priest, Mission, 203. 
24 Ibid., 204–205. 
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subject of legalization. There are official documents published by executive branch 
departments that are devoted to explaining why such policy would be detrimental to the 
U.S.25 
MacCoun and Reuter discuss the fact that some U.S. officials believe that drug 
legalization would destroy America, Gray delves into the media’s role in burning the 
moral detriment of drugs into the psyche of the American populous. Gray notes several 
very public occurrences that have happened since the 1960s. In Gray’s estimation, the 
“War on Drugs” was a Nixon-era distraction from a war weary America crippled by a 
new incomprehensible generation of degenerates. Drugs were the prime suspect in the 
social chaos razing the U.S. at the time. Gray explains that the media gave overwhelming 
attention to a 1970s doctor who wrote a prescription for a friend on the White House 
staff, using a false name to protect her identity. The media blew the story out of 
proportion, seeking ratings and paper sales, ultimately ruining the doctor’s reputation. 
The 1980s and 1990s also gave America a video feed into the drug trade in TV shows, 
such as COPS and the like, that showed the seedy parts of town and the criminals 
involved in the drug world, searing the horrors of drugs into the minds of viewers. Drug 
crime sells, and the more violent and heinous the coverage and the more crimes are tied 
to drugs, the more viewers will pay attention. This also creates a sentiment that there is 
no positive side to drugs; hence, drug policy should only get tougher in an effort to 
eliminate drugs and all associated crime.26 
The U.S. persistence in prohibitive drug policy is a testament to it intransigence 
on the subject. In a hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the 
Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, in the first session of the 
108th Congress, U.S. officials recognized that there is a problem in Latin America; 
however, divergent from Youngers and Rosin’s work, the U.S. representative does not 
acknowledge that U.S. policy is exacerbating that problem. The U.S. cites the success of 
its drug policies in Latin America and recognizes that any problems in Latin America are 
                                                 
25 MacCoun and Reuter, Drug War Heresies, 40–41. 
26 Gray, Drug Crazy, 93–110. 
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strictly endemic. In 2003, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
John P. Walters explains the relationship between the U.S. and Colombia:  
President Uribe has committed himself to fighting the terror organizations, 
destroying their capacity to continue to exact such a terrible price against 
the Colombian people and to drug trafficking people throughout the 
hemisphere. He has extradited 26 since last August; he has stepped up 
eradication programs; he has implemented plans to help restart a variety of 
investigative and security matters, including the Air Bridge Denial 
program that was suspended earlier; and he has made it clear that his 
commitment is to reform the society of Colombia so it serves all people. I 
think that is a significant change you haven’t seen in the past. Either there 
was not the strength or the vision to do that, to make rule of law a fact in 
all of Colombia, for all Colombians, to make security and education and 
health reform and economic development a long-term goal. I think he and 
we understand that you have to first reduce the extent to which Colombia 
is a war zone. It is hard to get effective infrastructure growth, it is hard to 
serve people’s humanitarian needs when they are suffering and threatened 
at the level that they are.27 
Mr. Walters goes on to describe the success of the U.S.-led eradication program in 
Colombia. The U.S. and its partners destroyed the coca equivalent of approximately 650 
metric tons of pure cocaine, which had a value of about 65 billion dollars.28 This is hailed 
as a huge success; however, there is no mention of the human toll to the rural peasantry 
who have no other means of subsistence, other than coca production, nor is there an 
estimation of environmental damage. There is also no prediction of where coca 
cultivation may shift to because of U.S. actions in Colombia. Perhaps, despite Priest’s 
claims in her book that the failure if Plan Colombia was obvious in 2002, Mr. Walters 
still did not receive that memo by February of 2003. He does not acknowledge the 
balloon effect or other adverse effects that are now evident to many scholars and 
journalists since the inception of Plan Colombia.29  
                                                 
27 Overview of U.S. Policy toward the Western Hemisphere:  Hearings on H. R. 1088, Day 1, Before 
the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, 108th Cong. 8–9 (2003) (statement of Robert Menendez, 
Committee on International Relations). 
28 Ibid., 9. 
29 Ibid. 
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While some authors recognize the secondary and tertiary effects of U.S. policy in 
Latin America, Bertram et al. focus on U.S. drug policies’ adverse effects on the U.S. 
They describe three kinds of collateral damage. Firstly, the drug war worsens crime and 
health problems, it does not fix them. Second, it worsens social tensions by fueling racial 
and class divisions. Lastly, the authors explain that U.S. drug policy corrodes democratic 
institutions and values. These effects mirror the sufferings of Latin American countries 
affected by U.S. drug policy; however, the authors fail to discuss or provide a parallel to 
any of the ill effects suffered in Latin America, focusing predominantly on why drug 
policy has become obdurate in the U.S.30 
5. Omissions 
McGuire and Carroll wrote a thesis that proposes legalization. These authors 
however, do not address more incremental approaches to drug policy change. They focus 
on the economics of drug policy and possible positive outcomes of a policy that the 
government has not issued. McGuire and Carroll barely examine why the U.S. has thus 
failed to implement a change in drug policy or why the U.S. appears to mitigate any 
approach to effect such a change. McGuire and Carroll do however, project promising 
economic advantages of a radical policy change. Given that it is not the topic of their 
thesis, McGuire and Carroll focus solely on monetary consequences of U.S. prohibitive 
policies with little consideration for the human toll in the U.S., much less, Latin 
America31. 
Priest’s approach to the stagnation of drug policy equates to U.S. institutions’ 
justification for existence. She fails to explain causal factors that explain why some U.S. 
institutions may believe that the war on drugs is the nexus of their existence. Priest’s 
work describes inherent flaws in U.S. policies such as Plan Colombia; however, besides 
mentioning the strengthening of armed groups and the increase in human rights abuses, 
                                                 
30 Eva Bertram, Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe, and Peter Andreas, Drug War Politics (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996), 32. 
31 McGuire and Carroll, “Economics of the Drug War,” i. 
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she does not mention the adverse effects of U.S. policies on democratic institutions in 
Latin America. What would alternate U.S. policy mean for Latin America?  
MacCoun and Reuter devote an entire section to an assessment of alternatives; 
however, when addressing the reasons why U.S. officials are resistant to drug policy 
change, they simply state that the reason is because public opinion supports prohibition. 
MacCoun and Reuter fail to give a causal explanation defining why public opinion is as it 
is. They suggest that perhaps people view reformist proponents as pro-drug instead of 
pro-health and anticrime, for example. MacCoun and Reuter suggest the current drug 
policy proponents’ message is simple, “Drugs are bad, so let’s stop drug use,” and the 
reformist arguments are too complicated.32 Author Renee Scherlen’s article titled, “The 
Never-Ending Drug War: Obstacles to Drug War Policy Termination,” explores the 
persistence of U.S. drug policy and how it is related to public opinion. She expands on 
and emphasizes empirics to back her assertions, pushing for a viable policy termination 
strategy using prospect theory. Scherlen’s article does a good job explaining why the 
current policies persist.33 However, she does not sufficiently engage in ways to change 
public perception of the Drug war; a necessity she claims must occur if current policy is 
to undergo termination. Neither MacCoun and Reuter, nor Scherlen explore the collateral 
effects of U.S. policy over Latin American society. Could an awareness of these side 
effects awaken the U.S. public and shift public opinion thereby forcing a reevaluation of 
U.S. prohibitive policy?  
In this limited literature review, Younger and Rosin’s work is the predominant 
source on U.S. policy effects in Latin America.34 They are the only authors that recognize 
and explain the second and third order effect of U.S. policy in the region. These effects 
are important to understand because they may be the foundation to spark a change in U.S. 
policy thinking. As noted above, many Latin American leaders are beginning to come 
                                                 
32 MacCoun and Reuter, Drug War Heresies, 402.  
33 Renee Scherlen, “The Never-ending Drug War: Obstacles to Drug War Policy Termination,” 
Political Science & Politics 45, no. 1 (2012): 72, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096511001739. 
34 Youngers, Drugs and Democracy. 
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forward, explaining the adverse effects of U.S. drug policy in their countries, and seeking 
alternative means to curb, holistically, the ill effects of illicit drugs.  
6. Contributions 
Strong and heartfelt arguments against U.S. drug policy change are compelling. In 
fact, current research discussions on the unending quest to eradicate illegal drug use 
reveal little hope for U.S. drug policy change. Intransigent policy makers fail to see the 
big picture — how current policy simply stagnates the drug problem within the U.S. and 
worsens the drug problems of the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Jay W. Forester’s 
article titled, “Counter Intuitive Behavior of Social System,” explores the frustrations felt 
as the same failed approach to society’s woes led to a fundamentally worse situation 
because “dynamic behavior of social systems is not understood, government programs 
often cause exactly the reverse of desired results.”35 Nevertheless, it appears some 
American states have recognized that decriminalization and or legalization may be an 
alternative answer to the federal war on drugs. What effect will these state’s policy shift 
have on the federal level? Is this part of a social acceptance process that will lead to 
federal policy change? If U.S. drug policy does change what effect will this have on U.S.-
Latin America relations? This thesis attempts to consolidate and outline the effects, good 
or bad, that the U.S. drug policy has imbued in U.S. relations with Latin America over 
the years. U.S. policy and actions may have created a pattern of relationships and side 
effects in Latin America that can help predict what a continuation and possibly a change 
of current U.S. drug policy may look like or how this might alter U.S. relations with Latin 
America and conditions within Latin America. This thesis not only seeks to explore 
reasonable solutions that may curtail drug related crimes and health issues that current 
prohibitive policies exacerbate, but, near the end of the thesis, briefly outline steps that 
may help these policies reach actually implementation.  
Finally, a U.S. shift towards decriminalization and legalization could create an 
increase in U.S. soft power in Latin America. The U.S. could capitalize on unintended 
consequences of a change in domestic drug policy; the international implications of such 
                                                 
35 Jay W. Forester, “Counter Intuitive Behavior of Social System,” Technology Review (1971): 1. 
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a change could be profound. That said, the U.S. would have to adjust the roles of its 
military and counterdrug agencies alike to ensure their individual survival and the smooth 
transition of U.S. drug policy as a whole. Therefore, this thesis may also seek to address 
ways to limit possible U.S. military obstinacy resultant from the current drug policy 
stagnation that Priest describes in her book The Mission.36 How would the U.S. 
relationship with partner Latin American nations change? The international implications 
of such a domestic change to U.S. policy are profound and merit intense study. 
7. Conclusion 
While the consensus exists that U.S. drug policy has stagnated and that the “War 
on Drugs” has ultimately failed, there is divergence in the reasons why the U.S. continues 
to pursue a failed policy. With the exception of U.S. policy makers, there is also a 
consensus that U.S. drug policy has generally had adverse effects in Latin America. 
While authors cite moral reasons or social reason for a lack of policy change, few pursue 
a causal analysis to explain the policy continuity. The literature presents the arguments 
for and against drug policy change; however, this thesis seeks to address how policy thus 
far has influenced U.S. relations with Latin America and how policy persistence or 
change may affect those relationships and how persistence or change may affect domestic 
affairs within Latin America. 
C. METHODS AND SOURCES 
A historical analysis of U.S. drug policy that discusses when and how drugs 
became illegal will help build an understanding of how, through careful causal analysis, 
U.S. drug policy influences U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. Review of 
primary and secondary sources may also reveal why the U.S. continues to pursue supply-
side polices when the resultant outcome highlights the fact there is no end in sight to the 
war on drugs.  
                                                 
36 Dana Priest, The Mission (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003). 
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The primary U.S. sources for this thesis consist of reviews of foreign programs, 
such as the Swiss needle exchange program, and reviews of U.S. government 
commissioned studies of the pros and cons of drug legalization. Primary sources under 
review, mostly from congressional hearings in the late 1990s and early 2000s, underscore 
the reasoning for U.S. intransigence in its drug policies. How therefore, is this persistence 
in a failed policy affecting our relationship with Latin America? The predominant 
secondary source for this thesis is Youngers’ book Drugs and Democracy in Latin 
America. A comparison of several other secondary sources with Youngers’ works will 
help form an understanding of U.S. drug policies second order and tertiary effects on U.S. 
relationships in Latin America.  
Utilizing appropriate secondary sources, the thesis will also explore possible links 
between current policy and the international power it bestows upon the U.S. The soft 
power theory may also reveal the dividends that drug legalization could pay to the U.S. in 
the form of diplomatic and political relations, international trade, and development.  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The first section of this thesis will discuss the history of drugs in the U.S. They 
were not always illegal; therefore, what prompted a change in U.S. policy? How was this 
change in U.S. drug policy framed? Do the origins of U.S. drug policy help explain its 
persistence? How has U.S. drug policy evolved over the decades? This section will bring 
the reader to the first key point of U.S. drug policy matters and examine how they began 
to set the stage for a significant change in U.S. relationships with Latin America. 
The next sections begin to examine key turning points in U.S. drug policy. 
Namely, the period surrounding the World Wars, and especially the Nixon era start of the 
infamous war on drugs. How did this new war affect our relationship with Latin 
America? How did U.S. policy shift with other presidents such a Reagan and Bush the 
elder? Did this cause a shift in our relationship with the U.S.’ southern neighbors? The 
Bush II era saw the start of the Global War on Terror, and an effort to thwart drug 
prominent terror-funding sources. These sections will explore if relations with Latin 
American caused the U.S. to more, or less aggressively fund (supply-side) counterdrug 
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efforts. The Mission by Dana Priest may help answer the question: Are U.S. agencies 
trying to justify their existence by vainly pursuing supply side methods of interdiction?  
The Final sections will provide an assessment. Have the relationships, explained 
in the previous sections, been good or bad overall for Latin America. What have been the 
consequences to the U.S. and Latin America for its persistence in the war on drugs. How 
will this persistence affect U.S. relations with Latin America in the future? Why has the 
U.S. persisted in its supply-side policies? Recent news releases point to a scenario were 
Latin American countries may cease to support U.S. supply-side drug policies in Latin 
America. This section will also provide a look into the stability of Latin America. It 
seems to have endured, thus far, in the way on drugs. The thesis will also briefly examine 
tactics that can politicians and the public spark change. How will U.S. foreign policy 
towards Latin America change if U.S. drug policy changes? The money saved and earned 
from the discontinued War on Drugs and revenue from taxing legal drug products can be 








II. HISTORY OF U.S. DRUG POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Today, domestic and international movements are seeking alternative methods to 
solve the modern drug problem. As public opinion turns away from traditional U.S. anti-
drug policy, understanding the history that led to this policy is imperative to discerning 
the effects and strategic implications of enduring U.S. drug policy or a policy of change. 
This chapter focuses on the origins of U.S. drug policy; it will examine how U.S. 
domestic concerns and resultant policies contributed to an anti-drug U.S. foreign policy. 
Notwithstanding an apparent lack of success over the past four decades, the U.S. has 
maintained a supply- focused policy approach. As it happens, one of the world’s largest 
consumers of illegal narcotics also leads the world’s eradication and enforcement efforts. 
The U.S. is presently the “world’s largest consumer of cocaine (shipped from Colombia 
through Mexico and the Caribbean), Colombian heroin, and Mexican heroin and 
marijuana.”37 With this in mind, the U.S. also spends more than $51 billion annually to 
curb the inflow of illicit drugs.38  
B. ORIGIN STORY 
1. The Whisky Rebellion 
In the U.S. case, the first scenario of controlling mind-altering substances 
pertained to alcohol. Drugs have been around for a while and perhaps the oldest known 
form of an intoxicatingly addictive substance, taken for its effects, which cause changes 
in behavior and perception of reality, is alcohol. Likely around for over 10,000 years, 
humans preferred alcohol to water. Fermented beverages were safer than ancient water 
sources, provided more nutrition than water, and possessed psychotropic properties. 
There are numerous scholars and even a Discovery Channel documentary titled, How 
Beer Saved the World, that explain alcohol as a catalyst that helped spark Western 
                                                 
37 Central Intelligence Agency, “Illicit Drugs,” The World Fact Book, accessed March 16, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2086.html.  
38 “Drug War Statistics,” We are the Drug Policy Alliance, accessed March 15, 2014, 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-war-statistics.  
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civilization. In addition to alcohol’s incorporation into various religious practices, over 
time alcohol provided the wealthy a means of conspicuous display and became an 
important economic force for cross-cultural trade.39  
Although it was likely the most popular intoxicating substance in the Americas, 
alcohol was not the only drug brought into the new world.40 In the early seventeenth 
century, English settlers founded the colony of Virginia and one of the items brought 
with them into the New World was the marijuana plant. The plant spread thought the 
New England colonies and served as a staple cash crop until the Civil War. Marijuana 
was an important commodity; however, it was not a target of contention when the U.S. 
was forming its government. That said, in the late eighteenth century the newly formed 
U.S. government’s first attempt at regulating a psychoactive substance41 was with a 
liquor excise tax. Medical doctor and author Lawrence S. Brown notes in his article, 
“Substance Abuse and America: Historical Perspective on the Federal Response to a 
Social Phenomenon,” that perhaps the first evidence of U.S. concern over psychoactive 
substances was when the First Continental Congress recommended “that the ‘pernicious 
practice’ of distilling grain be curbed.”42 By means of licensing and taxing the sale of 
alcoholic beverages, 1791 marked the first U.S. legislation governing alcohol 
consumption. These early laws were not because of federal concern over the health of the 
public. The 1794 tax was an attempt by the government to capitalize on alcohol’s 
popularity. This tax would provide substantial revenue and set a precedent the federal 
government would use again in the future.43  
                                                 
39 Penn Museum, “The Origin and Ancient History of Wine,” University of Pennsylvania Museum of 
Archeology and Anthropology, accessed April 12, 2014, 
http://www.penn.museum/sites/wine/wineintro.html.  
40 Ibid.  
41 A drug that can produce mood changes and distorted perceptions. The Free Dictionary by Farlex, 
s.v. “psychoactive substance,” accessed April 1, 2014, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/psychoactive+substance.  
42 Lawrence S. Brown, “Substance Abuse and America: Historical Perspective on the Federal 
Response to a Social Phenomenon,” Journal of the National Medical Association, 73, no. 6 (1981): 498; 
John C. McWilliams, “Through the Past Darkly: The Politics and Policies of America’s Drug War,” 
Journal of Policy History, 3, no.4 (October 1991): 498. 
43 Brown, “Substance Abuse and America,” 359. 
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One can imagine that around the time of the American Revolutionary War, the 
citizenry of the new U.S. detested taxation. Western Pennsylvanian farmers, many of 
whom distilled whiskey to supplement their income, cared little for the new excise tax. 
The Whiskey Rebellion ensued. In July of 1794, embittered rebels of the Whiskey 
Rebellion targeted a tax inspector’s home for destruction. Against his better judgment, 
and under the advice of Alexander Hamilton, George Washington sent 13,000 troops to 
Pennsylvania to subdue the rebellion. By the time the troops arrived the rebellion had 
dissolved. That said, there were two Pennsylvania men arrested and convicted of treason. 
Later however, President Washington pardoned these men. The years that followed the 
rebellion found alcohol and tobacco use unfashionable, and public drunkenness led to the 
first ideas of temperance. Instead of passing prohibitive laws to limit consumption, 
government policy favored the encouragement of moderate consumption by using reason 
and moral persuasion. Brown explains that alcohol was also the first substance used by 
the American government to oppress an ethnic group—the American Indians. At that 
time, a communal myth existed that stated natives were more prone to alcoholism, and 
therefore the government issued laws prohibiting Indian consumption of alcohol. Ideas 
such as this fueled the flames of the temperance movement. However, the use of reality 
altering substances continued to be part of America’s journey into modernity. 
2. The Civil War and After 
As America grew so did the market for psychoactive substances. Beyond the 
increase of alcohol and tobacco use, the consumption of imported opiates jumped in the 
years preceding the Civil War. The Civil War itself fostered yet more increases in the 
consumption of tobacco and opiates. The military issued and rationed cigarettes to 
soldiers, and the use of tobacco and opiates became a significant source of tax revenue 
for the federal government. Opium was the analgesia of choice on the battlefield and in 
hospitals alike. Alcohol, on the other hand, fell in profitability as states issued prohibitive 
laws that limited its targeted federal tax revenue. After the Civil War, consumption of 




time—cocaine. The federal government repealed state laws prohibiting these substances, 
therefore, making them legal; that said, their use was less than respectable and seen as 
somewhat of a threat to society.44  
Brown notes a relationship between psychoactive substance use and the ensuing 
federal response:  
Rural and middle class America had become progressively discontent over 
their perceived loss of status during a period of increasing industrial 
expansion and immigration. This, together with the support of many 
churches and the strong efforts of temperance forces, formed the 
overwhelming majority of the prohibition political base. However, prior to 
the effective organization of these groups, the powerful tobacco and 
alcoholic beverage interests, the advertising blitz by the proponents of 
these substances in concert with the craze over patent medicines 
(containing varying amounts of opium, heroin, and cocaine), and the 
almost universal acceptance of these substances by physicians and 
pharmacists as curealls” led to an almost insatiable demand for 
psychoactive substance use.45 
These “psychoactive substances” provided a lucrative market in the U.S. While 
allowing a profitable market to thrive, the conspicuous consumption for pleasure by some 
Americans once again acted as a mechanism for groups to lobby the federal government 
and legally repress ethnic minorities, in this instance the Chinese and African Americans. 
Anglo Americans viewed the customary opium smoking of Chinese immigrants as an 
anti-social and anti-American subversive act. Furthermore, “the fear of cocaine was used 
as a political ploy in the South to rationalize lynchings, segregation, and other tactics to 
keep blacks in ‘their place.’”46 Not as profitable a market, alcohol faced a perilous period 
prior to the Civil War.47 
Alcohol was the target of contempt around the era of the Civil War. One 
witnesses a characteristic American prohibitive perspective when studying the case of 
                                                 
44 PBS Online, “The Whiskey Rebellion,” 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/duel/peopleevents/pande22.html; Brown, “Substance Abuse and America,” 
498–99. 
45 Brown, “Substance Abuse and America,” 499. 
46 Ibid., 499. 
47 Ibid., 499. 
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Rev. John Russell of Michigan. Russell and the Masonic society organized the 1869, 
Chicago prohibition convention. The Prohibition Party emerged from the conference 
asserting James Black of Pennsylvania as its front-runner for the presidential election of 
1872. Although he stood no chance against Ulysses S. Grant, the Prohibition Party’s 
actions “marked the beginning of organized efforts to ban the sale of intoxicating liquors 
and, more important, served as the foundation for America’s prohibitive approach to its 
most difficult societal woes.”48 While the alcohol industry suffered the wrath of the 
prohibitionist movement the narcotics industry grew.49 
In the nineteenth century, opium, heroin, and morphine were legally sold and 
common throughout the United States. The five leading and legitimate avenues of 
acquisition were via a prescription, over the counter in drugstores, in the checkout lane of 
the grocery and general stores, through mail-order catalogues, and through the flourishing 
patent medicine industry. Despite its legality, society viewed the use of narcotics as 
immoral. That said, drug use in the home was not grounds for the removal of one’s 
children nor was it cause for divorce. In fact, according to authors Marvin H. McGuire 
and Steven M. Carroll, “addicts continued to participate fully in the life of the 
community, holding jobs, attending school and otherwise contributing to society.”50 At 
the same time, the anti-alcohol movement was rapidly gaining ground and the 
prohibitionist sentiment towards alcohol and those who used it was much more fervent 
and organized.51 
Prohibitive state laws burgeoned against alcohol in the last half of the 1890s 
leading to an appreciable decline of alcohol consumption; however, as these laws passed 
there was a corresponding increase in the use of opiates, tobacco, and cocaine. The 
pattern of decreased consumption of one psychoactive substance prior to or concurrently 
with an increase in the consumption of another, repeats throughout American history.52 
                                                 
48 McGuire and Carroll, “Economics of the Drug War” 2–3. 
49 Ibid., 2–3. 
50 Ibid., 3. 
51 Ibid., 2–3. 
52 Brown, “Substance Abuse and America,” 499. 
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3. Food and Drug Import Act to the Harrison Act 
A popular social drug of the day was opium and although prohibitionists focused 
primarily on alcohol, narcotics would soon again feel the wrath of federal law makers. Up 
to the turn of the century, states enacted various opium laws that limited its use without a 
physician’s prescription. An 1875, San Francisco law was one of the first: it outlawed 
opium dens (popular with Chinese immigrants); however, it failed to prohibit opium’s 
use, import, or sale. Anti-drug policy did not begin because of the vast addiction rate of 
psychoactive substances. Addiction rates at the turn of the twentieth were insignificant; 
around five times lower than today. The narcotics addiction rate in 1900 was about 0.4 
percent;53 in 2012, 6.8 million Americans (or 2.6 percent) used psychotherapeutic 
prescription drugs without a prescription.54 The Interstate Commerce Act, which is the 
main legal basis for Federal drug regulation today, did not serve the same purpose in the 
late nineteenth century. In 1886, the Wabash case (state regulation of the railroads) heard 
before the Supreme Court, resulted in the barring of states from regulating interstate 
commerce, and asserted that the federal government possessed this authority. Therefore, 
in 1887, “Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, which railroad barons found 
more appealing than the more restrictive state laws.”55 That said, the first congressional 
act against opiates was the Food and Drug Importation Act issued on August 30, 1890. 
This act levied taxes on morphine and opium. From then on, the federal government 
created several laws and acts directly aimed at opiate use, abuse, and control.56 
Many scholars agree that the early laws against opium were for the suppression of 
the Chinese minority. During this period of American history, the federal government 
focused particularly on the unification of the Northern and Southern states, in limiting 
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foreign influence in the western hemisphere, and sought territorial expansion and 
consolidation westward to the Pacific. Author Julia Buxton notes in a 2008 policy 
research working paper, that within this young nation, the ethnic majority launched an  
Anti-Chinese campaign that was led by organizations such as the 
American Federation of Labor and the Workingmen’s Party and it came as 
part of the package of measures that included restrictions on the rights of 
Chinese immigrants to marry, own property and practice certain 
professions. As such, the first U.S. drug laws were premised on racial 
prejudice, not a preoccupation with national health.57 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the U.S. began to shift its vision outward. In 
1898, the U.S. annexed Hawaii and under pressure from big business and the media 
President McKinley pushed forward an expansionist effort after winning the Philippines, 
Puerto Rico, Guam, and Cuba from the Spanish as a result of the Spanish American War. 
These actions planted seeds of mistrust throughout Latin America, and would help define 
future relationships between the U.S. and its southern neighbors. Although the U.S. 
granted Cuba and Puerto Rico limited autonomy, the U.S. set about the task of bringing 
the Philippines into modernity. That said, the task of civilizing the Philippines would 
prove expensive, therefore the governor proposed allowing the more than 190 opium 
stores to operate and excise revenue from its sale. Christian missionaries in the 
Philippines were outraged. The Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Manila, Charles H. Brent 
and the president of the International Reform Bureau (IRB), Reverend Wilbur Crafts, the 
main American missionary organization in the Philippines, lobbied against such a 
move.58  
In 1903, the U.S. formed a commission of enquiry on opium use in the 
Philippines. This marked the first federal enquiry into the consequences of consuming 
intoxicating substances. Bishop Brent led the commission and its findings were 
antithetical to those of an 1895 British Royal Opium Commission, which convened to 
assure elites that the harmful effects of opium were few and far between, thus ensuring 
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the UK’s participation in the lucrative trade of the substance. Buxton explains that the 
Philippines Commission found the unregulated opium market to have “grave effects on 
the health and moral capacity of users.”59 The commission recommended that medical 
needs alone dictate opium import, sale, and use. The U.S. government accepted the 
recommendations of the commission and thus ended a tradition introduced by the Dutch 
in 1700; the uninhibited use of opium was no more.60  
This step marked the beginning of the now-familiar entanglement of drug policy 
and foreign policy, and the birth of what might be called “narco-diplomacy.” The 
Commission recognized that for their recommendation to succeed, the U.S. government 
had to undertake international agreements. Countries that produced these drugs needed to 
cease its importation into the Philippines in order for the domestic prohibitive laws to 
work. From this period in U.S. drug policy history two important tenants emerge. The use 
of psychotropic drugs had come to be viewed as wrong in itself; therefore, the federal 
government must regulate such drugs to protect its citizens. For this to happen, the U.S. 
had to engage in diplomacy to reduce the influx of narcotics supplied by foreign nations. 
Buxton sums up the consequences of this well: “This prohibitionist, supply-side (focus) 
shaped the structure and orientation of the international control regime that was to 
emerge.”61 Although previous instances had proven futile due to the development of 
black markets to feed the still present demand, the enforcement of prohibition through 
punitive measures and the cooperation of partner producer nations, helped in its success. 
However, partner nations viewed the U.S. government’s punitive measures against 
narcotics users as extreme and proved a source of contention in the coming years.62  
For U.S. narco-diplomacy to have weight in the international realm, the federal 
government had to emplace an anti-drug domestic policy. To capitalize on ruling of the 
above mentioned 1886, Wabash/railroad case, the U.S. federal government introduced the 
Pure Food and Drug act of 1906, which did not prohibit the use of drugs but required 
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doctors and pharmacists to label items that contained morphine, alcohol, opium heroin, 
chloroform, cocaine, or marijuana. Prohibitionists were dissatisfied with these measures 
because they believed the consumption of any of the items listed above was morally 
wrong and thusly, should be illegal. President Roosevelt observed the growing domestic 
concerns over drugs as an opportunity to garner support at home as well as a platform in 
which to speak on an international stage promoting the U.S. as a power player in that 
arena.  
In 1909, the first ever international meeting over drug concerns, the Shanghai 
Opium Commission, served as a vehicle for the U.S. to enact an amendment to the 1906 
Pure Food and Drug Act. Touted as an illustration of U.S. concern over international drug 
trafficking, the U.S. hoped to alleviate tensions with China by limiting the medicinal uses 
of opium, prohibiting the importation of smoking opium, and introducing a burdensome 
tax on domestically produced smoking opium. This is one of the first instances of 
domestic drug policy directly influencing U.S. foreign policy relationships. The 1909 
conference was also a first in domestic drug policy influencing foreign policy with Latin 
America. The U.S. recognized that several Latin American countries desired to enter into 
the profitable coca market. As they were not present at the conference, Latin America 
was an essential partner that would help ensure U.S. desires of controlling the 
international trafficking market were possible. Latin America was still without 
representation during the following conference hosted by the Netherlands. The 12 nations 
that were present decided its outcome and created article 22 of the convention that named 
all nations involved in the global drug trade. Editor of Drugs in the Western Hemespher: 
Cultures in Conflict, William O. Walker notes that, then Secretary of State Huntington 
Wilson, failed to recognize Latin America’s participation in the desired policy would 
cause those Latin countries Great “social, economic, and political dislocation at home.” 63 
Wilson’s note of April 15, 1912, a section of which is reproduced below, takes no notice 
of the mismatch between “U.S. policy objectives and the place of drugs in the daily lives 
of many Latin Americans, both in and out of government, [U.S. policy maker’s attitudes 
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of the day indicated a] likelihood of cultural clashes in the region over the nature and 
extent of drug control.”64 With no regard to the chaos that U.S. policy could cause Latin 
American states, Wilson encourages his diplomatic officers in Latin America to secure 
Latin American participation and alliance with U.S. interests: 
There was a general agreement at the Conference that the signature of the 
Convention of the Latin American States was essential, if the convention 
was to become effective in causing the stopping of the unnecessary 
production and use of and traffic in the drugs dealt with, in suppressing the 
great moral and economic evils associated with the abuse, and in thereby 
achieving the laudable and practical object of the governments which were 
parties to the International Opium Commission and the International 
Opium Conference.65  
Therefore, the U.S. undertook diplomatic communication and maneuvering to 
ensure that all of Latin America would become signatories to the convention that resulted 
from the1911 International Opium Conference in Hague. Domestic lobbing continued in 
the U.S. and took on racist overtones, portraying ethnic minorities as creatures 
transformed and made even more evil by the consumption of psychotropic substances, 
creating a bane to American society. In this era of growth, the fear of minorities, and the 
U.S. trying to find its place in the international community, the federal government began 
to seek out a means of drug control enforcement within its borders.  
4. The 1914 Harrison Narcotics Act  
The Harrison Narcotics Act was the first document that gave the U.S. government 
teeth in the domestic fight to eliminate drug use. Earlier attempts at introducing similar 
laws failed. For example, Congressman David Foster introduced a bill in April 1910 that 
had similar control goals; however, the bills harsh penalties and the inclusion of patent 
medicines caused Congress to reject the bill. The years that followed brought about a new 
Congress; Democrats controlled the 62nd Congress of 1912, and felt a strong influence 
from the South’s race mentality (see Figure 1).  




Author John C. McWilliams notes that this Congress was more accepting of 
“claims that cocaine was to blame for many of the assaults committed by blacks against 
whites.”66 Anti-drug proponents also played on the societal turmoil brought about by 
World War I (WWI). American families feared that their children could become victims 
of Asian opium-addicts; the American public held this idea over from the “Yellow Peril” 
fear at the turn of the twentieth century (see Figure 2).67 
 
Figure 1.  1914 magazine article on cocaine.68 
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Figure 2.  1899, “Yellow Terror” editorial cartoon.69  
An aggressive media campaign and the efforts of Congressman Francis B. 
Harrison made the new drug law possible. The Harrison Act was a culmination of years 
of effort. Laurence Brown explains: 
The climax of federal involvement during the era of progressive reform 
was the Harrison Act (1914). In the background of well publicized 
associations between tobacco and alcohol, between alcohol and opium, 
and between opium and crime, the attitudes of pre-World War I America 
culminated in regulatory laws directed at foreigners and ethnic minorities. 
Although the foregoing was important, the federal response was motivated 
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more as an attempt to fulfill the U.S. obligations in international 
agreements. Resulting from the 1911 and 1912 Hague Conventions, these 
agreements consisted of promises by member countries to restrict opium 
production to medical and scientific research, to enact laws prohibiting 
opium use, and to control the manufacture, sale, and use of morphine and 
codeine.70 
A tax measure designed to regulate the distribution of narcotics, the Harrison Act 
allowed institutions to operate beyond the act’s original intention. The act required “all 
persons who imported, manufactured, distributed, or handled the regulated substances to 
register and pay an occupation tax.” However, because the act did not preclude the 
interference with medical practices the Bureau of Internal Revenue used the act as a 
prohibition law. According to Brown, “The Bureau determined that opiate dependence 
was not a disease and that dispensing or prescribing opiates to dependent persons was not 
‘in the course of his professional practice’ or ‘for legitimate medical purposes.’”71 Thus, 
U.S. government institution began loose interpretation of legislation to achieve the moral 
ends of eliminating drug use in the U.S.72  
McGuire and Carroll note that the New York Medical Journal published an article 
on the effects of the government’s prohibitionist efforts. On May 15, 1915, within six 
weeks of the prohibitive legislation the journal reported: 
The immediate effects of the Harrison antinarcotic law were seen in the 
flocking of drug habitués to hospitals and sanatoriums. Sporadic crimes of 
violence were reported too, due to the desperate efforts by addicts to 
obtain drugs, but occasionally to a delirious state induced by sudden 
withdrawal.73 
In light of the domestic chaos the Harrison Act caused, the Act was important to the 
government because of American international interests, not because of domestic 
concerns. Interestingly, the desire to emplace federal control of tobacco, marijuana, and 
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cocaine were not yet present. Tobacco was a profitable U.S. commodity and despite state 
laws prohibiting the nonmedical use of marijuana, cocaine, and opiate products, most 
Americans only used the term temperance when speaking of alcohol. Alcohol prohibition 
became a contentious subject over the next few years.74 
Although earlier attempts of a prohibition amendment failed, after the U.S. 
entered WWI, prohibitionists used the war effort to rally public support. Astute anti-
narcotic advocates bandwagoned on the rising popularity of alcohol prohibition and 
together helped manifest the Red Scare of 1919 as U.S. nationalism burgeoned and an 
intense fear of Bolsheviks swept the nation. These groups also associated beer with the 
Germans (see Figure 3). Combining this image of alcohol with anti-narcotic rhetoric 
allowed these groups to portray these substances as a threat to the American war effort in 
WWI. In the eyes of the American public, maintenance therapy,75 once an accepted 
method of detoxification, became almost universally associated with the Nazi mainstay of 
socialism (see Figure 3). In 1920, the eighteenth Amendment and 1920 Volstead Act 
prohibited alcohol consumption. The Volstead Act allowed the Prohibition Unit of the 
Treasury to establish a narcotics division. The Supreme Court also played a role in this 
period by allowing amendments to the Harrison Act that “provided sterner maximum 
federal penalties, extended the prohibition provisions to cover coca leaves, cocaine, and 
opium derivatives, and prohibited heroin importation entirely.”76 On the international 
front in the campaign against narcotics, the U.S. and the League of Nations that arose 
after WWI formed the Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) out of the desire to create an 
international drug control regime.77  
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Figure 3.  WWI political cartoon: A German-American displays an American 
flag in public, but hoists a beer to the Kaiser in private.78 
In 1924, Conferences in Geneva sought to define the “legitimate” medical drug 
market, and the Geneva Convention of 1928 expanded a control system to regulate the 
import and export of narcotics in hopes of preventing the export of drugs beyond the 
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medical and scientific requirement determined adequate by the OAC. Aside from refining 
the institutional structure and scope of drug control efforts, the 1928 Convention pulled 
more drugs under their umbrella of control and took the lead in classifying drugs 
according to their scientific relevance and hazards. That said, the Geneva Convention 
failed to keep licit drugs off the illicit market. In 1925, the OAC determined that 39 tons 
per year, for the next four years, would meet the international community’s medical and 
scientific needs. However, licensed production facilities shipped approximately one 
hundred tons of opiates per year to undisclosed locations over that period. Meanwhile, 
the domestic situation in the U.S., resulting from stricter drug laws, grew grim.79  
McGuire and Carroll explain one should have no trouble identifying the negative 
fiscal and government effects of Prohibition. The 1929 Porter Narcotic Farm Bill and 
further legislative restrictions based on the Harrison Act helped government spending and 
the drug dependent population of federal prisons explode. The federal government spent 
$3.59 million on Prohibition of alcohol and drugs (approx. $44.4 million in 2014). By 
1930, it rose to $44.03 million (approx. $596.6 million in 2014). Furthermore, the 
construction of federal prisons nearly doubled as the prisoners prosecuted via federal 
authorities rose from 91,669, in 1925, to 137,997 in 1932 (increasing 51 percent in seven 
years). As demand to terminate prohibition grew, narcotics control and alcohol 
prohibition became separate issues, by 1933, the passage of the 21st Amendment ended 
prohibition.80 
5.  The Interwar Period after Prohibition 
With the success of amending the Constitution and achieving national alcohol 
prohibition in 1918, leading activists turned their attention to the anti-drug campaign. In 
the early 1920s, the International Narcotic Education Association distributed “racist, 
eugenicist, hyperbolic and medically incorrect ‘information’ about the ‘Narcotic 
Peril.’”81 Entrenched in the mainstream media and embedded in the thinking of the day, 
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support for drug prohibition endured beyond the end of the prohibition. The lessons of 
prohibition were lost on anti-drug proponents. Buxton literates the failures of prohibition 
and the doomed future of anti-drug policy succinctly:  
Although alcohol prohibition had generated a flourishing, difficult to 
police, gangster dominated illicit industry worth millions of dollars, 
pressure for domestic and international drug prohibition persisted …82 
While spooling up the anti-drug campaign at home, the U.S. congruently participated on 
the international level to bolster their domestic efforts. 83  
On the international front, the U.S. participated in a 1931 convention meant to 
address the failures of the earlier anti-drug Geneva conventions of the 1920s. The 1931 
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs sought to fix, in advance, the quantity of drugs needed to meet global 
requirements. As per the convention, no country could produce any quantity of regulated 
drug beyond the conventions determined quantity. Furthermore, the Convention garnered 
the power to embargo any country that violated this tenant. The convention also required 
Signatory states to establish a dedicated drug enforcement agency to enforce domestic 
drug laws to keep their nation compliant with international obligations.84  
The power players of the day, countries like Japan, also manufactured the 
narcotics in question. These manufacturing nations ostracized the new push to quail a 
good source of national revenue and thus passed the blame of the slow progress of the 
international movement on the backs of producer nations. Before limiting their 
manufacturing market, countries like Japan pushed for strict limitations on states that 
grew the drugs. From this, enormous pressure mounted on Latin American producer 
states. Although hesitant, the international community forced Latin American states to 
recognize their drug subcultures, the domestic problems that these subcultures caused, 
and the lack of their ability to do anything about it. Unfortunately for Latin America, its 
inevitably slow response to international drug control policies indicated obstinacy and 
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political failure in the eyes of the U.S. Particularly the states of Honduras and Mexico fell 
into U.S. crosshairs; the latter retorted that the U.S. needed to up its ante on its own 
domestic drug issues. Already years in the making and with a bit of irony against the 
Mexican state, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 resulted as an attempt to increased 
domestic control of the U.S. drug market.  
After an investigation into the questionable activities of the former deputy 
commissioner of the Prohibition Bureau, Harry J. Anslinger, headed up a newly 
independent anti-narcotics bureau within the treasury department, the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics (FBN). With his history as a bureaucrat and supported by the pharmaceutical 
lobbyist, Anslinger pushed for heavy-handed measures to deal with addicts and 
traffickers. In the middle of the Great Depression, Anslinger skillfully negotiated the era 
preventing his bureau’s merger with others in fiscal consolidation efforts and he managed 
to secure funding to keep his agency afloat by solving high profile drug cases of the time. 
To secure his bureaus future, Anslinger recognized a new drug could serve as a threat 
base for the next few years. This drug was popular in the southwest, a recreational staple 
of the Mexican-American community.85 
Needing to bolster its moral high ground in the international community, the U.S. 
government gainfully aligned itself with anti-marijuana legislation that Anslinger backed. 
In conjunction with conservative newspapers, Anslinger told tales of FBN encounters and 
cases were those who smoked the drug committed unthinkable acts. Although Anslinger 
did not create the marijuana scare, he propagated it advocating its dangers to society any 
chance he could. Figure 4 is an example of the type of stories that fueled the 1930s, 
Anslinger anti-marijuana propaganda mill. Congressman Robert L. Doughton introduced 
a bill in 1933 that imposed “‘an occupational excise tax upon certain dealers in 
marihuana to impose a transfer tax upon certain dealings in marihuana, and to safeguard 
the revenue therefrom by registry and recording.’”86 In 1937, Doughton’s efforts would 
result in legislation that became the model for future U.S. antidrug policy. Congress 
supported the Marihuana Tax Act, although it was obvious that some of its supporters 
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knew little about the drug. Author John C. McWilliams recounts events that occurred on 
the house floor immediately preceding the passage of this legislation.  
Even members of Congress who supported the legislation betrayed a lack 
of knowledge about marijuana. Congressman John D. Dingell (D-Mich.) 
thought marijuana was the same as locoweed.87 When the bill was 
presented for debate on the house floor, Congressman Bertrand H. Snell 
(R-N.Y.) asked, “What is the Bill?” Representative Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.) 
replied, “It has something to do with something that is called marihuana. I 
believe it is a narcotic of some kind.” The debate on the house floor lasted 
less than half an hour. Only one witness, Dr. William C. Woodward, 
legislative counsel for the American Medical Association, opposed the bill 
during the hearings. The committee’s reaction was hostile. Not only did 
members ignore Woodward’s objections, but several questioned his 
credentials and challenged virtually every statement he made against the 
legislation.88 
Anslinger was the largest supporter of this bill and recognized as the authority on 
marijuana use, erroneously linked mental insanity with marihuana use with stories similar 
to those depicted in Figure 4. McWilliams recalls Anslinger’s favorite marijuana case: 
Twenty-one-year-old Victor Licata, a young Mexican in Florida who, 
“under the influence of marijuana,” axed his mother, father, two brothers, 
and sister to death. [Stories such as these kept congressional] members 
horrified. Licata did smoke marijuana, he did have an axe, and he did 
murder his family. Anslinger’s testimony was factual, but it was not 
complete. He did not mention that eleven days after the murder a 
psychiatric examination report appeared in the Tampa Times confirming 
that Licata was criminally insane and subject to “hallucinations 
accompanied by homicidal impulses.” Authorities also concluded that his 
insanity was most likely inherited and was not marijuana-induced.89  
Anslinger successfully established the government’s marijuana-insanity link. This 
link had an enduring effect on public opinion for at least the following 25 years. Similar 
to the Harrison Act, Congress designed the Marihuana Tax Act as a tax revenue measure; 
however, it soon became a mechanism for drug enforcement. The domestic and 
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international sociopolitical climate of the day allowed for these bills to pass and evolve 
over time. Those that enforced these laws utilized punitive measures, and urged the 
judicial system to permanently imprison drug offenders. Anslinger’s tough approach to 
drug enforcement became the standard over the next 30 years.90 
The decade before World War II (WWII) marked the true beginning of the U.S. 
allowing its domestic policy to shape its relationship with Latin America. Once falling 
into the realm of a public health issue (if any) in Latin America, drug control pressure 
from the United States pushed for Latin American nations to view drug control as a law 
enforcement issue and called for stricter adherence to international conventions and for 
Latin America to help the U.S. meet its desire to end illicit drug use.  
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Figure 4.  Detective Tales comic on the perils of marijuana.91  
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III. PRE–WWII U.S.–LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MISTRUST 
The starting point of U.S. drug policy in Latin America followed a long history of 
U.S. economic expansion and military intervention in the region. Spanning from the 
1898, intervention in Cuba, to the U.S. involvement in the 1954, Guatemalan coup, which 
was well into the global antidrug campaign, aggressive U.S. policies and reactionary 
fervor led to a legacy of suspicion, mistrust, and antipathy toward U.S. motives in Latin 
America. 
President Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933, with the resolute intention of 
reestablishing a prudent and sincere relationship with Latin America. Roosevelt proposed 
the Good Neighbor Policy (GNP), a policy of cooperation and trade with Latin America 
that would replace military action as the primary means to defend U.S. interest in the 
Western Hemisphere. However, Roosevelt’s policies were only moderately effective at 
assuaging Latin American disdain for imperialist tendencies imbedded within previous 
U.S. behavior. The GNP faced challenges in Latin America, as some countries held that 
the U.S. was still promoting the economic subservience of Latin America, and a policy of 
“what is good for me [the U.S.] isn’t necessarily good for you [Latin America].”92 U.S. 
actions along the way, especially those in Guatemala, undermined the GNP and fed Latin 
American mistrust of the U.S. The following subsections rely heavily on the few sources 
found that cover this period of U.S.-Latin America relations concerning drug policy. 
B. MARIJUANA AND RELATIONS WITH MEXICO 
Although there was a history of mistrust towards the U.S., Latin American 
countries moved forward with the rising superpower, following its lead in the global anti-
drug campaign that began following the first international drug summit, the Shanghai 
Opium Commission of 1909. U.S. prohibitive policies towards alcohol failed. New 
political targets needed to emerge and events surrounding WWI and the 1924, Geneva 
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commission made drugs and rational target. Author Lawrence Brown explains that 
prohibition was unsuccessful for two reasons. First, prohibitions failed because the 
majority of Americans were proponents of moderate alcohol consumption and were only 
against excessive drinking and drunkenness. Secondly, the period of the Great 
Depression was difficult enough; jobs lost due to prohibition exacerbated the situation, 
not to mention the loss of potential revenue from not being able to tax alcohol. 
Prohibition only worsened the situation surrounding the Depression and left room for the 
growth of other vices. The substances of choice were tobacco and marijuana. The use of 
these substances skyrocketed. Cigarettes were becoming fashionable, thanks to a massive 
marking campaign, and marijuana was much easier to procure than alcohol. With the 
failure of prohibition, the profitability and popularity of cigarettes protecting that market, 
prohibitionist attention turned towards marijuana.93  
One must garner a brief background in order to understand why marijuana 
became a popular drug during the depression and why it became a target of opportunity 
for politicians thereafter. Following the 1910 Mexican Revolution, an influx of Mexican 
immigrants brought the popular recreational use of marijuana with them across the 
border. An affordable alternative to alcohol, marijuana became available to purchase for 
.25 cents at “Tea Pads” that popped up all over the country. PBS.org reports that by 1930, 
500 “Tea Pads” existed in New York City alone. These pads also became popular to the 
black “hepster” jazz culture. Association with minorities and with the recreational use of 
marijuana, known to the public as Mexican in origin, the existence of marijuana use in 
America led to an increase of resentment and fear of the Mexican immigrants who 
brought this habit with them across the border. Federal control over psychotropic 
substances failed and upset the moral order of society, frustrating American citizens and 
worrying politicians seeking to maintain office. Eager to delegate responsibility and 
avoid a severe backlash, the U.S. government began to re-examine their prohibitive 
policies.94  
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 With the failure of prohibition, the federal government once again favored the 
state enactment and enforcement of drug laws. State politicians had their own local issues 
to tend and sought ways to gain favor from their constituency. Therefore, southwestern 
states, along the border of Mexico pressed the government to tighten immigration 
controls. Brown asserts that border states used the marijuana issue to “obtain stricter 
federal barriers to Mexican immigration so that these states might be able to rid 
themselves of an unwelcomed manpower surplus in regions devastated by 
unemployment.”95 Once again, U.S. drug policy became a mechanism to meet the needs 
of domestic interests. These domestic issues, setting the precedent for future interactions, 
shaped U.S. foreign policy with Latin America. The main source of the marijuana supply 
came from Mexico; therefore, the FBN began a foreign policy campaign to coerce 
Mexico into helping the U.S. curb marijuana use within American borders.96 
Leading up to WWII, Anslinger’s influence on foreign relations with Latin 
America is palpable. Consul William P. Blocker, in Ciudad Juarez, which borders El 
Paso Texas, wrote the State Department to report on the drug situation in his area of 
responsibility on April 23, 1931. In his letter, Blocker explained that he recently met with 
a special representative of the Mexican government, charged with stamping out the drug 
problem in Ciudad Juarez. This drug agent recognized that Ciudad Juarez (see Figure 5) 
was a hotbed for cross-border smuggling and sought to assist blocker in every way 
possible. Blocker noted the influence of Anslinger’s FBN within the text. American 
authorities from the treasury department contacted the Mexican government who, near 
instantly, took action to address the situation in Ciudad Juarez.97 The Mexican 
government gave its Ciudad Juarez drug enforcement agent the full support of military 
authorities located to the south in Chihuahua. Blocker explained that this Mexican drug 
enforcement agent distrusted the civil authorities in Ciudad Juarez, thinking them corrupt. 
Blocker was hopeful that this new vivacious attitude exhibited by the Mexican 
government through this special representative would allow him to thwart the root of the 
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trafficking scourge that was originating in Mexico. If thought guilty of drug crimes in 
Ciudad Juarez, the drug enforcement agent claimed he would send criminals to Mexico 
City for trial, were the courts would prosecute and send them to a penal colony in the 
Islas Marias.  
 
Figure 5.  Map of Ciudad Juarez courtesy of Google Maps.  
Blocker explained that the Mexican military post in Chihuahua was also sending 
two hundred troops to patrol the U.S.-Mexican border and the General in charge of this 
military group recently visited the U.S. and offered an information sharing relationship 
with any authorities interested in stopping cross-border smuggling operations. Finally, 
Blocker believed, the Mexican government was willing to help the U.S. stamp out the  
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drug problem that plagued the Mexican border city. The situation that Blocker describes 
seems to exemplify that the FBN’s efforts to coerce the Mexican government were 
successful98 
Alas, Blocker’s hopes turned to frustration as the reality of the Mexican 
government’s tepidness towards the problem became evident. The media within Mexico 
also participated in the politics of cross border drug control policies. On May 21, 1936, 
the newspaper Excelsior became part of the public discussion on marijuana. U.S. efforts 
to stymy this drug gave the Mexican media an inroad to challenge corruption in their 
local government and social problems plaguing their communities. The newspaper 
charged that: 
Certain unscrupulous authorities turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to the 
traders who are able to bribe them. Agents and inspectors drawing 
wretched salaries, policemen seeing their salaries “bitten” by their own 
companions, and “coyotes” going around the courts and prisons, constitute 
effective traffickers by providing good hiding places so that drugs and 
marijuana may be passed around without trouble.99  
The Excelsior also took on the quest against marijuana to define a cause for the 
social detriments within Mexico. They saw a root cause for these problems originating in 
marijuana addicts. According to Walker, “These persons, it goes without saying, do not 
work, and rob or steal in order to secure their marijuana. And soon, there arises a chain of 
offences against property and against life itself which flows from the marijuana 
business.”100 Excelsior demanded a tougher response from the Mexican government to 
address the marijuana issue. Articles such as this helped spark and further debate among 
the Mexican people. The Excelsior helped validate and make real, issues that the 
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Government, especially local authorities, seemed to ignore these issues; issues such as a 
corrupt and underpaid police force. These news articles also helped the U.S. in its effort 
to toughen its stance against Mexico.101  
Although Mexican authorities did put forth effort to help solve the drug problem, 
the U.S. was not content and displayed a one-sided approach to handling certain aspects 
of cross-border drug control. For example, in November 1936 Ambassador to Mexico, 
Josephus Daniels, realized that U.S. efforts in the drug war might have been contrary to 
President Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy. Ambassador, Josephus Daniels got wind 
that the U.S. had sent drug enforcement agents over the Mexican border without Mexican 
approval. He protested that such action served no purpose and could possibly offend the 
Mexican government. Walker goes on to explain that Mexico wanted to expand and 
improve its antinarcotic program. In 1937, the chief of the anti-narcotics agency in 
Mexico requested permission from Ambassador Daniels to meet in a border city to 
discuss alterations to earlier agreements. Mexican officials wanted their drug 
enforcement agents to be allowed to cross over the border into the U.S. if need be. 
Narcotics authorities in Washing turned down this request as they had done some years 
before. The U.S. had no trouble funneling agents into Mexico as it saw fit, but would not 
allow Mexico into the U.S. for any reason. This one sided approach to the drug problem 
left Mexico seeking other options in its fight to control drug trafficking in Mexico.102 
The success of Mexican drug control was limited. Mexico had trouble producing 
evidence of any lasting success. Newspapers within Mexico also fell prey to Anslinger’s 
viewpoints on the extreme dangers of marijuana, publishing sensational stories of 
marijuana induced insanity and violence. U.S.-Mexican drug control talks went back and 
forth around the time of the 1937, U.S. Marijuana Tax Act to no avail—no formal 
bilateral plans ever developed. A New Mexican Drug Czar, Leopold Salazar Viniegra 
formulated his own plans to reduce illicit drug trafficking in Mexico. Garnered from a 
meeting in 1937, Walker explains Salazar’s intentions: 
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Mexico, he stated, could only reduce the flow of illegal drugs through 
government-controlled distribution, with the aid of an expanded antidrug 
educational campaign, and through the construction of more hospitals to 
treat addiction. Salazar did not underestimate the difficulty of the task. “It 
is impossible to break up the traffic in drugs,” he told [supervising San 
Antonio customs agent, H.S. Creighton], “because of the corruption of the 
police and special agents and also because of the wealth and the political 
influence of some of the traffickers.” During the meeting, Salazar 
mentioned that he did not consider it his duty to act as a policeman in 
supervising drug control activity. In so doing, he implicitly warned that his 
policy on control would probably not parallel that of the United States.103 
Salazar did want to cooperate with the U.S. He supervised the burning of poppy 
fields and other U.S. preferred tactical drug control activities; he simply took a different 
strategic approach to drug control. This drew protest from U.S. officials who complained 
to Mexican authorities. Salazar sought to minimize the punitive approach to antidrug 
policy. Salazar advocated a treatment approach and called for hospitals and dispensaries 
to supervise the recovery of those in need. He also envisioned a state monopoly on the 
sale of drugs. This would have been a great source of revenue for the developing country. 
The U.S. remembered the failure of its dispensary efforts in antecedent years and 
projected the same results for Mexican programs. The U.S. believed that only the “strict 
supervision of commerce in drugs and confinement of addicts could eliminate the 
trade.”104 The U.S. viewed Salazar’s approach as a nullifying factor that would 
completely render U.S. efforts fruitless.105  
Salazar also published a longitudinal study that spanned 14 years and studied the 
effects of marijuana smoking by the Mexican lower class. The study revealed that there 
was no evidence to suggest psychosis resulted from marijuana use. Marijuana did not 
create violent or criminal impulses and in fact, created far fewer social problems than 
alcohol abuse.106 These findings were exactly opposite of those of the FBN and 
Anslinger. Salazar was ridiculed by the U.S. and even newspapers in his own country. 
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These attacks forced Salazar to continuously defend the study and his desired policy of 
drug control. Walker explains that through all of this Salazar still believed:  
That the solution to drug problems did not rest with the jailing of addicts 
or the expenditure of large sums from the national treasury to track elusive 
smugglers. He felt that U.S. antidrug efforts, for example, suffered from 
this overly punitive and costly approach. Salazar wanted governments to 
alter their traditional perceptions of addicts and addiction. This meant 
revising, he declared, “the concept of the addict as a blameworthy, 
antisocial individual.’107 
These ideas were completely opposite of those in the U.S. Anslinger believed that 
the U.S. had a duty and responsibility to lead, supervise, and manage the vigilance of all 
other nations in their fight against drugs. In Salazar’s estimation, the U.S. was in no 
position to lead a global antidrug campaign when they had little understanding of the 
tertiary effects of their actions. Salazar argued that recidivism rates were high in the U.S. 
and since the enacted of its tough drug laws, more that 75 percent of voluntary drug 
rehabilitation addicts withdrew from the federal narcotics hospital in Lexington, 
Kentucky. Salazar went on to assert that the 1,300 inmates of the Lexington federal 
prison represented less than one percent of the total addicted population in the U.S. 
Salazar explained that with their overly punitive antidrug policies, the U.S. abandoned 
the remainder of the addicted American population to the illicit drug world.108  
Forced to resign by 1939, Salazar never got a chance to enact his antidrug 
policies. He lived in constant defense of his plans and ultimately U.S. pressure upon his 
government was too great. His plans never received unbiased study to determine their 
viability. Even after policy making changed hands in Mexico, the U.S. was never 
satisfied with Mexican antidrug efforts. The U.S. embargoed medical drug exports 
creating an economic hindrance and a strident political message. By 1940, U.S. efforts 
ultimately reshaped Mexican narcotic policy. Mexico took on the U.S. favored punitive 
approach. U.S. actions against Mexico during this period were no less than intrusive.  
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Walker asserts that U.S. “actions led to intervention in Mexican affairs, the reality of the 
professed Good Neighbor Policy of the Roosevelt administration must in this instance be 
brought into question.”109  
As explained in the second section of this thesis, Anslinger successfully 
established a link between marijuana and insanity. So too did the public link marijuana 
use with “lazy” Mexicans. Furthering the sentiment in the 1930s, prominent officials and 
physicians published articles and studies that dramatized the “alleged violent effects of 
marijuana and predicted that marijuana smoking would spread beyond the southwestern 
states.”110 With domestic policies tied to the control of minority groups, the U.S. took it 
upon themselves to create a universal antidrug policy for the nations of the western 
hemisphere where some of these minorities originated. The U.S. pushed its neighbors to 
enact stricter drug laws and tightened its own immigration controls. The U.S.’s historical 
paternalistic attitude led to actions as a self-appointed moral and political leader in the 
region. Without hesitation, the U.S. consistently prodded into Mexican affairs to 
manipulate Mexican drug policy. This precedent is a mainstay throughout U.S.-Latin 
American relationships and has bred Latin American contempt towards the U.S. over the 
years.  
C. COCA AND RELATIONS WITH HONDURAS, BOLIVIA, AND PERU 
1. Honduras 
Honduras was a nation of particular concern to the U.S. Honduras served as a 
throughput for drugs, especially Cocaine, to the U.S. The political situation within 
Honduras was slippery. Much exacerbated by the Great Depression, President Tiburcio 
Carias Andino, elected in 1931, had to deal with unstable political and economic 
conditions within his country. The U.S. had little sympathy for the internal situation of 
Honduras and publically criticized the perceived laxity of Honduras’ antidrug 
enforcement. The Honduran government took the criticism to heart; however, they were 
never able to live up to U.S. antidrug standards.  
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Diplomat Lawrence Higgins explains, in a 1933 letter to the U.S. State 
department, how the Honduran government seemed at first to adhere to U.S. interests by 
restricting the issuance of permits granting the importation of narcotics.111 However, a 
trusted source reported to Higgins that one Dr. Jose Maria Guillen Velez, a man with 
presidential aspirations and political connections within Honduras, procured an 
importation permit for Parisian opium, cocaine, and heroin, which far exceeded the 
amount needed for legitimate use in his tiny pharmacy in Puerto Cortes. Higgins explains 
that Velez was known as a big time drug dealer in Honduras and goes on to accuse the 
Honduran government of knowingly selling this permit to Velez with the knowledge that 
he would smuggle these drugs into the U.S. The corruption within Honduras no doubt 
existed and due to the political and economic climate of the day, Honduran authorities 
had little power to correct the situation. That said, the U.S. continued to pressure the 
government to do more.112  
The Honduran government realized its own limited abilities to curb drug 
trafficking within Honduras’ borders. However, in the patriotic defense of the “good 
name of Honduras,” the Honduran government published an editorial from the 
Tegucigalpa newspaper El Cronista.113 Honduras recognized that its trafficking woes 
could virtually disappear if the demand for illicit drug within the U.S. was not there. As 
far as Honduras was concerned, the U.S. was responsible for the drug trade plaguing 
Latin American nations. Failed U.S. policies such as the Prohibition were also a causal 
factor aiding the growth of the illicit drug market. The U.S. government could not 
recognize the path of failure its drug policies were building. Honduras charged, that with 
the vast wealth and resources at its disposal, the U.S. is unable to cease illicit drugs influx 
over U.S. boarders, nor is it able to address the demand and addiction problems of its 
society. Despite Honduras’s innocence, guilt, or incompetence in the matter of illicit 
trafficking compliance, it made several good points in their defensive article.114 U.S. 
                                                 
111 Walker, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere, 80.  
112 Ibid., 80–81. 
113 Ibid., 82. 
114 Ibid. 84. 
 51
prohibitive policies were costly and seemed to create ever worsening niche markets for 
illicit drugs that did not exist before and because of the punitive nature of U.S. policies, 
addiction was not addressed, therefore demand for illicit drugs could only increase.115 
Not able to see a way to curb demand within their own borders, U.S. officials 
continued to press Latin American governments to aid in antidrug actions. A major target 
in the region, the U.S. government believed that drug corruption infected all levels of the 
Honduran government and used rumors to help explain the validity of its beliefs. Such a 
rumor was a murder possibly linked to the drug trade. Honduran government official 
supposedly sanctioned the assassination of “Dr. Francis Sanchez U., Dean of the 
Honduran School of Medicine and Director of the Government Hospital,” for refusing to 
allow the importation of a surplus of narcotics, which Honduran official wished to traffic 
into the U.S.116 No evidence supporting this rumor surfaced, however it fed the 
assumption that the Honduran government was complicit in the illicit market.117  
Stuart J. Fuller reports on a conversation with businessmen in Honduras in a1939 
memorandum to the Department of State.118 Excerpts of this memo reveal that the U.S. 
judicial system is not without blemish in the matter of possible corruption. In 1933 
Raymond T. Kennett, while under the employ of the Transportes Aereos 
CentroAmericanos (TACA), was arrested in New Orleans for smuggling cocaine and 
morphine into the U.S. from Honduras. The standard sentence in such a case, in which 
Kennett plead guilty, was a five year prison sentence. The judge ordered Kennett to spend 
one night in jail and pay a five dollar fine. Although this author’s research revealed no 
records explaining why Kennett received such a light sentence, it is apparent this case 
received international attention and circulated throughout the world accompanied by 
Kennett’s picture. There was little derogatory light cast upon the U.S. judicial system as  
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being soft on drugs; however, revealed below, this case helps illustrate how U.S. 
domestic drug polices helped control big business and other nations through Latin 
America.119  
An important player in the Honduran business community, Transportes Aereos 
CentroAmericanos (TACA), a transportation organization, earned a stigma of suspicion 
because they kept Kennett in their employ. By the end of the 1930s, the relationship 
between the U.S. and Honduras had improved to some extent. War consumed Europe and 
U.S. attention began to shift to more pressing matters developing on the horizon. 
However, the State Department kept pressure on Honduras and in 1939, a state 
department memo addressed how a reputation, if perceived as not adhering to U.S. 
antidrug efforts, can damage a business. Eugene LeBaron, General Counsel of TACA, 
conversed with U.S. officials about the stigma arising around his company. While trying 
to conduct business with El Salvador, the El Salvadorian president forbade Kennett’s 
entrance into his country, placing TACA’s deal with his company at risk. Some other 
Latin American countries apparently enjoyed the favor they received from supporting 
U.S. policy and their actions would follow a strict adherence to U.S. policy. Rival 
businesses also used any drug trafficking connections that were possible to defame the 
reputation of competitors. TACA, in fact at the time of the above-mentioned meeting, 
was having its reputation attacked by its business competitors. U.S. policy influence is 
evident on many levels throughout Latin America. Not only did it have political 
ramifications for Latin American nations, U.S. policy also had financial consequences for 
big businesses that were perceived as less than compliant with U.S. interests. The 
following section will also demonstrate how U.S. policy influenced, not only the politics, 
but also the economy, culture and, traditions of Latin American nations.120 
2. Bolivia and Peru 
During the interwar period, Bolivia and Peru were not essential to combating the 
illicit drug trade supplying the U.S. In fact, by late 1930s the flow of illicit cocaine into 
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the U.S. had eroded. This fact emboldened Anslinger who claimed that his tough 
approach against cocaine allowed such a triumph. In the case of Bolivia and Peru, these 
countries were not a major throughput of illicit trade routes. Bolivia and Peru were coca 
producers. The U.S. by this point was the predominant crusader of drug control in the 
world and assumed and Universalist stance that all drugs with possible harmful side 
effects should be controlled. The best way to accomplish this in the mind of the U.S. was 
by controlling the global supply.121  
Coca cultivation was also a subject of debate within South America. The coca 
cultivation question reaches back to the colonial era of Bolivia and Peru, and ever since 
they deliberated on how coca should fit into society. The coca crop produced within the 
borders of Bolivia and Peru was essential to the native community’s workforce and was a 
traditional staple of their diet. Nonetheless, the cultural aspect and economic importance 
of coca was of little relevance to the U.S. government, the main interest of which was 
ending domestic consumption of illicit drugs. This placed the Bolivian and Peruvian 
government in a difficult situation. Coca was an important economic stabilizer for 
Bolivia and Peru. In Bolivia, Coca farmers were proactive in advocating their crops 
importance. They published a pamphlet that argued the positive qualities of the plant and 
defended its cultivation and use.  
a. Bolivia 
The U.S. believed that it was possible to manipulate the Bolivian coca market; 
perhaps the U.S. could alter the economic and symbolic value of coca. Although subtle 
attempts to do so failed early on, the U.S. and the other nations of The Hague Opium 
Conference concurred that true drug control constituted the inclusion of all addictive 
narcotics. That meant coca and cocaine were to be controlled substances; and therefore 
Bolivia must submit to coca cultivation control. U.S. officials in La Paz touted that 
curbing coca production would signal Bolivia’s compliance with the international drug 
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control movement to no avail. Nevertheless, Bolivian officials maintained the plants 
domestic importance. At the 1924 Geneva conference, Bolivian delegate Arturo Pinto 
Escalier, stated:  
His government found coca chewing to be “a perfectly innocuous 
activity.” More to the point he identified how vital coca was to 
maintaining the integrity of Bolivian culture. It would, he had previously 
told the OAC, “be impossible for the Bolivian Government to contemplate 
restricting the production of coca leaves without seriously interfering with 
the needs and economic life of the working population, particularly in 
mining districts, as coca leaves constitute for them a source of energy 
which cannot be replaced.” The United States would have to look 
elsewhere for control at the source.122 
With the global anti-drug movement encroaching upon them, coca farmers in Bolivia 
took action, and addressed the League of Nations.123 
The quest against cocaine was understandable. However, simply targeting the 
coca plant, which has other uses, was not a solution with which the farmers agreed. These 
farmers explained that before coca production is limited or abolished the scientific 
community must explore the positive aspects of the plant. Bolivian culture and societal 
norms adopted the use of coca over hundreds of years, and the Bolivian famers believed 
that the League of Nations ignored the “good things that coca brings to the indigenous 
working and farming classes of Bolivia.”124 Some opponents of the coca industry existed 
within Bolivia. However, coca proponents possessed considerable political power, and 
opponents of the plant such as Julio Cesar Perez, had a limited dissenting voice. Perez 
viewed the plant as a great oppressor of the natives and working class of Bolivia. Farmers 
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work harder and longer without providing the vital nutrients needed for the health and 
wellbeing. Nonetheless, Perez also recognized the considerable fiscal importance of the 
coca plant had for Bolivia.125  
Coca provided a vital economic benefit to Bolivia and therefore the Bolivian 
government had never considered ending coca cultivation. Furthermore, the working 
class simply chewed the raw coca leafs produced within Bolivia. The fact that the 
majority of the crop was consumed in this fashion minimized the chance that it could be 
converted into cocaine. Workers in other Latin American nations, such as Chile and 
Argentina, also consumed coca in raw form; this accounted for a substantial amount of 
exports from Bolivia.126 
Bolivian farmers lauded the benefits of the coca plant and professed that Bolivian 
Indians and other nations workers were mentally stronger, more physically robust, had 
better teeth, and lived much longer than their white counterparts, who did not consume 
the raw plant (see Figure 6). Although there are a myriad of other factors that contributed 
to the poor health and early death of wealthier whites in the area, such as a sedentary 
lifestyle and consumption of sugar, the effects of coca did not appear to shorten or lessen 
the quality of life of partakers. In their pamphlet, the farmers argued the health benefits of 
coca aggressively, and explored the consequences of coca eradication on trade and 
development.127 
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Figure 6.  Chewing coca is part of Bolivia’s cultural heritage.128 
The depression era was rough on everyone and in those difficult economic times, 
the Bolivian farmers exhorted their government and the international arena to allow 
Bolivia to focus on their own national development, to stimulate and grow their domestic 
industries. Trade partners such as Argentina and Chile adopted the League of Nations 
view of coca and opium as one in the same. Bolivia feared these nations would exact 
prohibitive tariffs on coca, whereby Bolivia would be obliged to reciprocate and import 
an import embargo as a sort of economic warfare to act as a trade balance. 
Coca is not only, as an industry, an economic factor of undeniable 
importance and one of the most lucrative sources of revenue; it is also a 
major industry whose cultivation and consumption can be expanded into 
the interior of Bolivia. … The reasons why the government will not place 
prohibitions on coca are quite basic: this product is essential not only as a 
source of national revenue but also as a matter of domestic commerce as 
well as border trade with Argentina and Chile. … There is no reason why 
the production and consumption of coca should be limited if the plant is an 
important factor in the productivity of the mines [the major economic 
strength of Bolivia]. … [Prejudicial trade tariffs against coca would create 
an unstable trade situation between nations. Given the fact that Coca is 
one of the only exports to other Latin American nation, and imports no 
unfairly tariffed items from other nations, such as Argentina, a biased 
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situation would arise]. Given these conditions it is not possible to establish 
commercial and tariff reciprocity; thus, there does not exist a trade treaty 
with our neighbor and we are free to limit imports in order to protect our 
comparable products and the industrial development of the nation. … We 
cannot accept a [trade] deal that gives much to them [Argentina] and little 
to us, … we should reserve the right to encumber imported goods in the 
name of our own national industries.129  
The coca farmers of Bolivia wanted to ensure that their government and the 
international community understood the importance of coca to Bolivian society. 
Although health of the natives was likely not the primary concern of the Bolivian farmers 
who spoke out, anyone would be hard-pressed to disagree with the economic detriment 
Bolivia would face if coca were taken from its economic repertoire. Peru faced a similar 
situation, as they too were major producers of the coca plant.130 
b. Peru 
By the 1930s, the Peruvian science community, with the help of U.S. funding and 
encouragement, began to recognize the harmful side effects of coca consumption on their 
native population; however, the economic concerns of the nation prevented any 
motivation for substantial prohibition efforts. The Peruvians argued that their natives 
were, for the most part grossly ignorant, and would be unable to abide by any prohibitive 
laws and would thusly continue to grow and cultivate coca for their traditional use. In 
fact, one man Dr. Carlos Enrique Paz Soldán, led a  
Nationalist campaign, from the late 1920s to early 1940s, heard from 
Washington to Geneva. In a dramatic reversal of American “supply-side” 
anti-drug logic, Paz Soldán argued that strictures on cocaine in the West 
had actually forced Peru’s excess coca into the nervous systems of 
Peruvian Indians. As an alternative to discriminatory League quota 
controls, he proposed a giant Peruvian state “Monopoly” to regulate, 
promote and modernize cocaine, one that would deploy its trading profits 
to wean suffering Indians from their coca-chewing pathology.131  
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Furthermore, in 1932, the head of the Peruvian Narcotics Office, announced to the state 
department that as a member of the League of Nations they were considering giving 
domestic cooperation to the global antidrug sentiment. However, he states: 
There will be no effort made to curtail the use of coca among the Indians 
and the small producers will therefore not suffer. On the other hand, the 
investments of the large establishments would be depressed by the 
consequences of the international agreement if the making of cocaine is 
limited. …there is a feeling in Peru that if drastic measures are taken to 
curtail cocaine production disastrous results to the trade will ensue in the 
mountains where it is an important activity. In Peru the present is not a 
favorable time to suggest curtailing any industry which shows a profit, 
regardless of its nature.132   
The Peruvian government promised close monitoring and control of their cocaine export 
business. The U.S. State Department recognized that at least for the moment the Peruvian 
Government had no intention to restrict coca cultivation.133  
In 1936, Peruvian President Oscar Benavides reiterated the nation’s stance. He 
stated that the nation’s coca industry was in crisis, and that any decrease in income would 
harm Peru’s national defense budget. He commissioned a study to cement the cultivation 
of coca in Peruvian society at the same time attempting to establish new laws to satisfy 
the requirements of the League of Nations. The president’s study did not mean that the 
nation’s stance on coca would change. Benavides made it clear that coca production was 
too valuable to the Peruvian economy to simply end it. The Lima newspaper, El 
Comercio, concisely explains the Latin American perspective on the League of Nations’ 
antidrug campaign.  
Economic and social reasons force us to consider the coca question as a 
problem that should be solved in Peru in relation to national realities and 
not by adopting fantastic principles that will intrude upon domestic affairs. 
[Walker summarizes], in other words, coca control was a matter of 
domestic politics in a sovereign state.134 
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Figure 7.  1930s ad referring to cocaine as a “pleasant wholesome 
substance?”135 
                                                 
135 Vintage Ad Browser, “Snap Out of Afternoon Drowsy Time,” accessed 26 April, 2014, 
http://www.vintageadbrowser.com/coke-ads-1930s.  
 60
The United States and the international community continued to pressure Peru. 
The U.S. also had a stake in Peru’s coca industry because the soft drink giant Coca-Cola, 
used cocaine as it secret ingredient in the world famous American soft drink (see Figure 
7). Eventually, U.S. officials established an FBN/State Department intelligence gathering 
network inside Peru. The Coca-Cola Company facilitated this spy network. Eventually, 
U.S. oriented drug control polices slowly seeped into Peru, though the Peruvians, as did 
the Bolivians, resisted the adoption of U.S. anti-coca strategies along the way. Author 
Paul Gootenberg highlights what he calls “the largest global puzzle,” and explains that 
the era [1920–1940] that saw the greatest plurality of cocaine regimes and mentalities—
including tolerated legal cocaine industries abroad—was actually the best for the U.S. in 
terms of cocaine as a volatile social problem.”136 That said, despite the domestic lack of a 
“cocaine problem” within the U.S. at the time, the U.S. continually pressed for Peru to 
assimilate its ideals, and still to this day, displays and intransigence towards any other 
antidrug approach.137 
Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru provide a small sample and glimpse into the Latin 
American perspective of the global antidrug campaign that the U.S. was championing. 
U.S. domestic concerns tightened tensioned relations with an already weary Mexico over 
marijuana concerns. During this period, the U.S. showed through its unwillingness to 
allow Mexican drug enforcement officials into the U.S., privileges garnered from U.S. 
Mexican cooperation would usually be one sided. The U.S. also desired to change the 
cultivation habits of Latin American states, which would have grave economic 
consequences, in not only Peru and Bolivia, but negatively affect trade within the entire 
region. The situation in Bolivia and Peru was such that the region could not simply cease 
hundreds of years of tradition and change a culture that adopted coca as a mainstay. 
Economies in Latin America developed around the coca plant; coca was rooted deep 
within the lives and commerce of South America. Despite facts such as this, the U.S. 
continuously pressured Latin America to adopt a single approach, the U.S. approach to 
                                                 
136 Gootenberg, Between Coca and Cocaine,” 27. 
137 Walker, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere, 113; Paul Gootenberg, “The Rise and Demise of Coca 
and Cocaine: as Licit Global ‘Commodity Chains’, 1860–1950,” 13, accessed 26 April, 2014, 
http://www.mamacoca.org/docs_de_base/Consumo/gootenberg_rise_and_demise_coca_cocaine.pdf  
 61
illicit trafficking. Simply nothing less would do. The U.S. offered no alternatives and did 
not trust Latin American Nations to develop their own antidrug strategies as they saw fit. 
Sovereignty, which is of paramount importance to the Latin American community, was 
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IV. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE MODERN DRUG WAR 
A. WWII AND AFTER, THE SITUATION CHANGES 
1. WWII Market Shifts 
As WWII grew closer, the U.S. began to see changes in antidrug activity. The 
U.S. government taxed cigarettes and banned the domestic cultivation of poppies. The 
federal government also aligned all narcotics laws under the newly established National 
Institute of Medical Health (NIMH) and placed all substances with narcotic like qualities 
it.138  
Drug consumption also changed in the 1940s: cigarette and marijuana use 
increased, while cocaine use declined. As the U.S. entered WWII, concerns over 
marijuana diminished as consumption patterns changed. Cigarette smoking was now 
socially acceptable and popular, especially in the urban scene. No longer did the U.S. 
promote cocaine use in its soldiers. Instead, the government distributed amphetamines, 
whose effects lasted longer, and through oral consumption, was easier for soldiers to 
consume. Despite the media campaign against its nonmedical use, Barbiturate became 
popular.139 This media campaign popularized barbiturates, which were previously barley 
known to the public. The misleading ads distributed by the pharmaceutical industry led to 
extraordinary profits from the barbiturate market. Furthermore, this era introduced 
concerns over the dangers of cigarettes; however, counterfactual and inticing ads from 
the tobacco industry helped the cigarette market enjoy steady growth (see Figure 8). 
While markets were shifting domestically the U.S. also positioned itself in the 
international arena in such a way to garner global preeminence as a world power.140 
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Figure 8.  “More Doctors Smoke Camels”1946 cigarette advertisement.141 
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2. U.S. Strength Grows  
The years surrounding WWII strengthened U.S. power in the global antidrug 
movement. Geneva’s Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB) and the Drug 
Supervisory Board (DSB) transferred many authorities to the U.S. government in 1941. 
These institutions became subservient to the U.S. and were required to assist the U.S. in 
developing new antidrug laws. Through multilateral agreements with the allies, the U.S. 
also gained singular control of all opium monopolies in Southeast Asia territories 
liberated by U.S. forces. This allowed the U.S. to control these opium markets and 
enabled the U.S. to introduce narcotics policies in areas unreachable before WWII. The 
strategic position of the U.S. in Asia and Europe during the war enabled strong 
diplomatic posturing with opium-cultivating neutral governments, such as the exiled 
Yugoslavian government, Turkey, and Iran. The U.S. secured opium production control 
within each of these governments. After the war, institutional structures in the antidrug 
infrastructure shifted once again. The newly formed United Nations (UN) absorbed the 
drug control responsibilities of the League of Nations. The two bodies, PCOB and DSB, 
transferred to Washington before the war, shifted back to Geneva control. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) assumed drug advisory responsibilities to the UN at which 
time the UN tasked the WHO to determine the addictive potential of known drugs. The 
1948 Paris Protocol was an international conference that brought any drug that may cause 
harm under the control of the UN, and states had the responsibility to report all new 
potentially harmful drugs to the UN secretary general.142  
3. Antidrug Reinvigoration 
Following the changes of the 1940s, the 1950s saw a domestic reinvigoration of 
antidrug efforts by the head of the FBN—Harry J. Anslinger. The combination of 
returning GIs plagued with addiction and a new threat, the spread of communism, created 
a social climate conducive to tougher drug laws. Fears of communism spread a U.S. 
sentiment similar to the earlier “Red Scare.” As in this earlier period, author Lawrence 
Brown explains, “narcotics, which then included cocaine and marijuana, were associated 
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with subversive activities of alleged Communists or their alleged sympathizers.”143 
Anslinger viewed marijuana as a gateway drug and pushed for harsher punishments for 
its users and all other drug offenders. The politicians of the day were all too eager to help 
introduce Anslinger’s stricter drug laws, riding the antidrug public hysteria straight to 
reelection.  
Ignoring other causes for the drug problems of his time, outlined above, Anslinger 
viewed the American judicial system as a cause for increased drug consumption and 
addiction rates within the U.S. Author John C. McWilliams explains: 
The major reason for the increase in drug violations, according to 
Anslinger, was a soft judicial system that was reluctant to assess sufficient 
prison terms. If the government was going to prevent the Mafia from 
flooding the country with drugs, save the youth of America from 
addiction, or stop a Communist take-over, existing penalties needed to be 
increased to keep traffickers out of circulation. Anslinger’s reasoning 
made sense, at least to those in Congress who introduced more than two 
dozen bills in 1951 related to drug enforcement. Just as he had fired the 
public’s ire about the emergence of a “killer weed” in the 1930s, which led 
to outlawing marijuana and the introduction of penalties to crack down on 
a new criminal class, Anslinger shaped and redefined the public consensus 
about drug policy in the 1950s by linking drugs with other unpopular 
issues like communism and the Mafia.144  
Minimum mandatory sentences came into effect for drug law violators. Non-U.S. citizens 
faced deportation if they violated any drug law. These domestic changes left some groups 
wondering if the new stiffer stance on drugs was appropriate.145  
4. Questioning the New Status Quo 
The pharmaceutical industry and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had 
an intimate relationship in the 1950s. The loose interpretation of drug regulations in the 
late 1940s permitted the FDA to allow the drug industry to run wild, producing drugs for 
profit without fully investigating their harmful effects. This resulted in the Thalidomide 
Tragedy (see Figure 9) and Congress finally increased control on the drug industry. 
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Concurrently, the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 introduced mandatory sentences of two 
years to life for drug offenders, depending if this was there first, second, or third offense. 
Furthermore, judges could no longer choose to suspend sentencing and surprisingly, one 
could be put to death for drug law violations.146 
 
Figure 9.  Many children in the 1960s, like the kindergartner pictured above, 
were born with phocomelia as a side effect of the drug 
thalidomide, resulting in the shortening or absence of limbs.147 
The failings of the FDA and the new harsher drug punishments led the American 
Bar Association (ABA) and the American Medical Association (AMA) to conclude that 
the federal laws were too harsh and grossly ineffective. The ABA and AMA publically 
criticized the federal government. They claimed that, similar to the polices espoused by 
the 1930s Mexican Drug Czar, Leopold Salazar Viniegra, the AMA and ABA believed 
that dealing with the addict’s addiction would be much more effective than mandatory 
sentences. These groups also criticized the harassing behavior that the new drug laws 
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promoted—narcotics officials routinely harassed medical professionals. Simultaneously, 
NIMH published studies claiming drug dependency was a psychological or physical 
disease. Although in stark contrast to FBN views, these new perspectives began to gain 
traction among the American public and federal officials.148 While this section examined 
the domestic and international effects if U.S. antidrug actions, the next section will 
examine how the WWII era influenced the Latin American Drug Market. 
B. WARTIME DRUG TRADE EFFECTS IN LATIN AMERICA 
1. Introduction 
In the 1940s, the U.S. consolidated the opium markets of Asia and effectively had 
a monopoly of the global opium trade. The Allies fought to restrict Axis access to any 
drugs that aided their war effort. The U.S. also tried to ensure that the Allies had an 
adequate supply of drugs for wartime medical needs. For this, the U.S. turned to the one 
of Latin American neighbor who had a cultivation and production system in place and 
robust enough to meet wartime demands. Peru was the only Latin American nation to 
supply drugs to the Allies in WWII. However, because of fears that Latin American 
narcotics could fall into the hands of the Axis, Anslinger and the Department of State, 
chose to micromanage Peru’s cocaine production. Anslinger maintained interest in 
Mexico as well, in this era. Without constant pressure from the U.S., Mexican authorities 
would diverge from U.S. predicated antidrug controls. Besides, Mexico had become the 
center of the global illicit drug trade. The years adjoining WWII brought many changes 
to the world.149 
2. Peru 
WWII was a destabilizing event on many levels. For Peru, the war greatly 
affected its commerce. The legal and illegal cocaine markets were in peril. With the 
preservation of their economy in mind, Peru was willing to do whatever was necessary to 
survive the season of war, even if it meant trading with the Axis. The Allies did not look 
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kindly upon this sentiment. Cocaine, as a commodity, acted as a bargaining chip and 
helped foster trade with other nations. One such example is illustrated in an embassy 
dispatch in 1941, where a British minister promised the purchase of Peruvian cotton if 
Peru would cease sale of cocaine to the Germans. With an excess of cocaine the 
Peruvians looked to offload it were they could. The Soviet Russians were an acceptable 
alternative to Germany and Italy, Peru’s previous customers. The U.S. conceived that 
cocaine shipments to Russia would provide a means for illicit cocaine smuggling, 
therefore, close U.S. monitoring was required.150  
The Great Depression helped to diminish demand for cocaine in the U.S.; 
however, the economic jolt of the war revived the dormant cocaine market. The U.S. 
realized this and knew the economic importance of the coca market in Peru. Needing a 
cocaine supply for the Allies, the U.S. positioned itself in such a way to leverage control 
over the Peruvian cocaine supply. The U.S. State Department relayed a message to the 
Peruvian Finance Ministry in which, the U.S. outlined the past drug policy failure of 
Peru, When Peru’s Finance Minister David Dasso requested to increase cocaine 
production. In 1942, State Department Narcotics Expert George A. Morlock stated: 
The Peruvian [narcotics] record is a bad one. Peru is apparently the only 
country in the Western hemisphere that condones the illicit drug trade. … 
Unless Peru betters its record by conforming to the terms of international 
agreements which it has signed and takes drastic and effective steps to 
eliminate the illegal trade, the United States is prepared to take all 
measures necessary to produce the desired result, including cutting Peru 
off from all sources of narcotic drugs and stopping its purchase of coca 
leaves. This last would be accomplished very simply by growing coca in 
Puerto Rico, where the production has been eliminated in order to give 
Peru its market. It would seem that the answer to Mr. Dasso should be that 
it is up to Peru to make concessions, not the United States.151 
Peru did adhere, at least momentarily, to U.S. regulations and meted out cocaine to the 
allies. Other Latin American nations also felt U.S. pressure over international drug 
control.  
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3. Mexico 
The U.S. tracked the production of opium within Mexico throughout the 1940s. 
Opium production tripled from 1942 to 1943 and U.S. customs believed that excess 
opium would be trafficked into the U.S. via guano shipments and Mexican coastguard 
vessels. The numerous ways available to smugglers to traffic illicit opium over the border 
into the U.S. and the massive land border between the U.S. and Mexico presented an 
insurmountable challenge. These facts left the U.S. with the impression that the only way 
to thwart the illicit flow of opium into the U.S. was to stop its cultivation within Mexico. 
The U.S. perceived that supply-side tactics were the only option available to stop drug 
flow. However, the U.S. did recognize that their recent venture in Asia led to the new 
opium market in Mexico. A Department of State dispatch from A. A. Berle Jr. stated, “It 
would appear that Mexico, replacing the Far East, from which supplies are no longer 
available, is fast becoming the principle source of opium illicitly entering the United 
States.”152 This extrapolation, well applied in this situation would see similar effect in 
South America in the Future (Plan Colombia). The U.S. placed the onus of the trafficking 
problem on Mexico. Berle explained, “Effective measures could best be taken at the 
source in Mexico. Naturally the problem is one for the Mexican authorities, but this 
Government [U.S.] is desirous of doing everything possible to induce and assist the 
Mexican authorities to stop this traffic.”153 The U.S. believed that if anything was to be 
done in Mexico, they themselves would need to be the catalyst for action. 
Mexican authorities found compliance with American antidrug standards difficult; 
the drug business was profitable to Mexican peasants and action against the peasant and 
the drug gangs that owned the crop would result in the deaths of interfering officials. That 
said, U.S.-Mexican relations waned appreciably after the end of WWII. The legitimate 
opium market was imperiled in 1945, the allies defeated Japan, and China was in civil 
war. The drug syndicates of Mexico were eager to meet demand, and those syndicates 
easily persuaded Mexican politicians to throw in their lot with them and profit in the 
illicit drug trade. In 1947, Anslinger publically rebuked the Mexican government for its 
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inability to curb opium production. Eventually, in 1948, U.S. and Mexico reconciled. 
However, throughout this process the U.S. maintained “an air of entitlement about 
intervention in Mexican politics.”154 The U.S. blindly sought its policy of supply-side 
eradication despite the strife it may have caused the citizenry of Latin America. 
4. Conclusion 
Historically, economic instability in Latin America gives rise to the cultivation of 
raw materials for manufacture to feed an illicit market. Latin American drug rings play a 
significant role in feeding U.S. drug demand while simultaneously providing work and a 
means for a better life to downtrodden lower classes. U.S. policies of eradication applied 
strife to the lives of the subsistence farmers who depended on illicit profits for their 
survival. The Mexican government’s tepid attempts at supply control and rampant 
corruption led to a tumultuous domestic climate full of contestation and controversy. U.S. 
empathy for economic hardship within Latin America may have allayed the tensions 
bolstered by the drug trade and allowed other antidrug measures to merit consideration. 
C. THE BEGINNING OF THE MODERN WAR ON DRUGS 
1. Nixon’s Drug War 
As mentioned above (Chapter IV, section A, subparagraph 4), the U.S. passed two 
bills as the drug reinvigoration ensued following WWII. The Boggs Act of 1951 and the 
Narcotics Control Act of 1956 allowed for harsher penalties for drug violations. The 
federal government fully implemented domestic drug control in the 1950s; however, the 
U.S. experienced a drug epidemic over the next two decades. American society grew 
weary of its soldiers returning home from the war in Vietnam addicted to heroin, and an 
unabated crime rate continued to climb.155 
American society accentuated the domestic drug problem and prompted President 
Richard Nixon’s declaration of war on drugs and a subsequent reinforcement of supply 
side strategies. In mass, American youth rebelled against their parents’ traditional values; 
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drug use was an integral part of the rebellion of this period. New drugs, ironically 
developed and utilized by the government, namely LSD and amphetamines, rivaled the 
rising popularity of marijuana and heroin.156 The stricter and more punitive antidrug laws 
did not sit well with an American society with shifting perspectives on personal 
freedoms. Drug use became part of the lives of an ever-growing population and the 
people of this culture began to understand the differences between their drugs of choice 
and the effects they induced. Drug legislation was a source of contempt, where the new 
drug partaking subculture rejected its merit.157 Groups publicly questioned how all drug 
possession and use constituted criminal and immoral behavior. This new drug subculture 
created and popularized drug terms, and created distinct groups of soft and hard drugs, 
studying and propagating the benefits and dangers of each.158 In antithesis of the status 
quo, movements of decriminalization surfaced and the damaging effects of punitive drug 
laws became a public debate. Nevertheless, the 1960s saw an increase in punitive drug 
policies as drug consumption skyrocketed. This decade saw a tenfold increase in heroin 
addicts and the same increase in marijuana arrests.159  
The increased crime rates and drug consumption throughout the 1960s prompted 
Richard Nixon, popularized as an anti-communist hero in the McCarthyism era, to run in 
the 1968 presidential campaign on a platform of “Law and Order.”160 Nixon explained 
that there is an inherent link between the diseases of drug use and crime. By successfully 
coupling drugs and crime in the eyes of the public, he could effectively kill two birds 
with one stone. In 1971, Nixon addressed Congress: 
Within the last decade, the abuse of drugs has grown from essentially a 
local police problem into a serious national threat to the personal health 
and safety of millions of Americans. … The problem has assumed the 
dimensions of a national emergency. … Drug traffic is public enemy 
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number one … and we must wage a total offensive, worldwide, 
nationwide, government wide, and if I may say so, media wide.”161  
Nixon’s prescription for the diseases of drugs and crime was to stiffen punishment and 
declare a “War on Drugs,” by destroying trafficking supply lines and eliminating source 
country cultivation of raw drug materials.  
In the international realm, years of multiple narcotics accords created and web of 
confusion. The international community needed to consolidate and simplify their drug 
control regime. Therefore, in 1961, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs became 
“the cornerstone of today’s international drug control regime.”162 The U.S. ensured that 
their prerogative on drug control found its way into the Single Convention. The 
Convention had three core objectives: to consolidate, organize, and extend controls 
within a single document acceptable to all nations; secondly, to simplify mechanisms of 
control by creating the International Narcotics Control Board (INBC); and lastly to 
extend and strengthen existing controls on all aspects of illicit drugs.  
In 1969, the U.S. Congress introduced new legislation and law enforcement 
mandates designed to combat the drug trade at home and abroad. On the home front, 
Nixon reorganized and increased enforcement via the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs (BNDD) and implemented the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act and the associated Title II Controlled Substances Act.163 After these laws, 
U.S. federal policy aligned completely with the international Single Convention. To 
ensure the capture of as many drug criminals as possible, this new act introduced “no 
knock warrants”; this increased the chances of a good bust when narcotics agents 
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searched private homes and businesses. 164 Nixon also created and placed under his direct 
control, the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE). Soon thereafter, in 1973, 
Nixon consolidated four antidrug institutions: the BNDD, the ODALE, the Office of 
National Narcotics Intelligence, and the Customs Service Drug Investigation. The result 
of this amalgamation was the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Drug 
incarcerations skyrocketed. The situation was so out of control and prisons were filling so 
quickly that in the late 1970s, even president Jimmy Carter endorsed the 
decriminalization of marijuana.165  
2. The International War on Drugs 
Illicit drug producers and traffickers became mortal enemies of the U.S.  Nixon 
described his strategy; he wished not only to curb domestic demand but also to  
strike at the “supply” side of the drug equation—to halt the drug traffic by 
striking at the illegal producers of drugs, the growing of those plants from 
which drugs are derived, and trafficking in these drugs beyond our 
borders.166  
U.S. relations with Mexico would soon deteriorate. U.S. Agency for International 
Development (AID) assistance was unable to prevent a delamination in the U.S.-Mexican 
relationship. Operation Intercept brought this change to the public’s attention in 1969.167  
In June 1969, the U.S. implored Mexico to apprehend smugglers and enact a 
national marijuana defoliation program. The Mexican government was slow to endorse 
any reforms in line with U.S. desires; nonetheless, they pledged their diligence against 
drug production and trafficking. In September of 1969, the U.S. launched Operation 
Intercept in an attempt to prevent the inflow of drugs, primarily marijuana, from Mexico. 
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Mexico supplied approximately 70 percent of marijuana consumed in the U.S.168 To 
block the flow of drugs into the U.S., government agents were supposed to man the 
2,000-mile border in a sufficient manner as to inspect all cross-border traffic. Mexico 
cooperation was lukewarm at best; it believed the operation would never get off the 
ground. To no-one’s surprise, the logistical nightmare created by this operation was a 
major contributor to its life of only three weeks. Not only did border-crossing waits 
increase from minutes to hours, border city businesses tanked and commerce plummeted. 
The economic detriments of the operation were immediately apparent, Mexico was 
outraged. The strain on future international relation with Mexico was palpable. From the 
ashes of Operation Intercept arose a new plan called Operation Cooperation, known in 
Mexico as the permanent campaign, which was generally more well received that 
Operation Intercept. As a testament to the primacy of drugs in Nixon’s foreign policy, 
this plan tried to align U.S. and Mexican strategies on enforcement.169  
Another indication of importance of the new “War on Drugs” was the budget 
increase to fund it. Congress allocated $6 million to drug enforcement efforts in the late 
1960s; funding jumped to $43 million in 1970 and grew to over $321 million by 1975. 
Remarkably, Nixon invested a larger share of funds to demand reduction; this however, 
came after prematurely declaring victory in the “War on Drugs.”170 Nonetheless, victory 
was not the right word for what was happening in the war on drugs. No matter what the 
U.S. or Mexico threw at illicit traffickers, drug rings had little trouble finding a way to 
supply American demand. Drug agencies continued their mission and antidrug funding 
continued to grow. The next two U.S. presidents placed focused their policies elsewhere, 
leaving Nixon’s antidrug policies alone. However, funding for the drug war shifted 
towards supply-side policy. 171 
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3. Drug War Revival 
Shortly after President Ronald Reagan took office, he revived the U.S. “War on 
Drugs,” by exclaiming: “We have taken down the surrender flag and run up the battle 
flag. And we’re going to win the war on drugs.”172 As societal desires and the fashion 
scene shifted, the popularity of certain drugs waned while others re-arose. Cocaine 
became the drug of choice by the 1980s, and although Presidents Ford and Carter did not 
emphasize the drug war, they grew the drug war treasury, which amounted to $855 
million by 1981.173 Regan endorsed several regulations that streamlined federal drug 
enforcement agencies and added intelligence assets into the fold. Then the Regan 
administration postured for military involvement in the drug war via additions to the 
Posse Comitatus Act. Over the next decade, the U.S. drug war escalated with drug 
enforcement budgets reaching more than $7.8 billion in 1993.174 
A 1980s media blitz against drugs increased public antidrug awareness and 
propagated a like mindset. “Zero Tolerance” slogans pervaded society, prompting shifts 
in both domestic and foreign policy.175 First Lady Nancy Reagan also hoped to 
discourage drug use via a media campaign titled, “Just Say No.”176 In the midst of a 
renewed vigor against drugs, President Reagan signed the 1986, Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 
further increasing drug penalties and prompting Armed Forces support for civilian 
agencies. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act was 
A bill to strengthen Federal efforts to encourage foreign cooperation in 
eradicating illicit drug crops and in halting international drug traffic, to 
improve enforcement of Federal drug laws and enhance interdiction of 
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effective drug abuse prevention and education programs, to expand 
Federal support for drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation efforts, and for 
other purposes.177 
President Reagan viewed drugs as a national security threat and sought to 
decrease drug supplies by targeting cultivation in Latin American countries. Author 
Colleta Youngers explains, “The presumption is that reducing supply will make the illicit 
drug trade more dangerous and costly. This in turn is assumed to drive down production, 
drive up prices, and ultimately discourage U.S. citizens from buying and using illicit 
drugs.”178 
With the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, supply-side tactics received 70 percent of all 
antidrug funding from the government.179 This funding shift increased pressure on South 
America, which was the focus of U.S. drug control foreign policy in the 1980s. The U.S. 
ignored evidence that suggested their supply-side tactics would fail. Short of a 
cataclysmic environmental destruction, eradication of the coca plant was impossible. 
Nevertheless, during this period, the U.S. also introduced a system of federal certification 
that effectively terminated aid to any nation that the U.S. judged not in compliance with 
drug eradication policies.180 Under Reagan, in the early 1980s, then Vice President Bush 
expanded control throughout the military and intelligence communities. Since Florida 
was a primary throughput for illicit drugs from Latin America at that time, Bush created a 
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efforts.181 As president, George H.W. Bush intensified the drug war; however, despite an 
antidrug funding increase to $6.4 billion, drugs were purer, cheaper, and more readily 
available by 1989.182  
The domestic drug situation in the U.S. had never been worse. Bush took office in 
1989, and in his first televised address, Bush declared an “assault on all fronts [against] 
the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today…”183 Bush expanded upon Reagan’s 
drug war efforts taking them in a new direction. The U.S. would now use military force, 
both Latin American, coupled with economic aide to carry out supply-focused tactics; 
this became central to foreign policy priorities in the region. The 1989 “Andean Strategy” 
evoked Bush’s model, “The Logic is simple. The cheapest way to eradicate narcotics is to 
destroy them at their source. … We need to wipe out crops wherever they are grown and 
take out labs wherever they exist.”184 In 1989, President Bush signed National Security 
Directive (NSD) 18 that “directed the Secretary of Defense to redefine the Pentagon’s 
mission to include counter narcotics as one of its core priorities.”185 Military drug 
enforcement expenditure grew from $357 million in 1989 to more than $1 billion by 
1992.186  
With the Cold War at its end, Latin America drug production became focus of 
American Military Attention who no longer had a large-scale threat that justified the 
enormity of the American war machine. The drug war provided an outlet for U.S. 
military might and activity. Aligned with the new Department of Defense policies, in 
1990, the Panama-based U.S. Southern Command exclaimed drugs as its “number one 
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priority,”— its budget jumped to $100 million by the end of the year.187 The Washington 
Office on Latin America explains that Latin American Nations begrudgingly accepted 
U.S. military aid in the war on drug, only because of the financial aid that it meant they 
would receive from the U.S.188 These same countries clearly discerned a drug control 
approach separate from U.S. Policy. Latin American officials explained that offering 
rural farmers positive incentives to grow something other than coca would perhaps be 
more effective than military interdiction or eradicating their crops. Although U.S. 
domestic drug policy influenced international relations with Latin America since the 
early nineteenth century, the permutation of the Andean Strategy and NSD 18 solidified 
the U.S.’s foreign policy approach to the drug war and has thusly defined relations with 
Latin America as never before.189 
4. Final Thoughts 
Events throughout the 1970s and 1980s preempted any chance of drug control in 
the western hemisphere. Author William Walker III explains:  
The combination of expanding demand in North America and Europe; the 
resultant increase in hectares given to marijuana, opium, and especially 
coca cultivation; the rise of guerilla and paramilitary violence in the 
Andes, particularly in Columbia and Peru; the accumulation of great 
fortunes by drug merchants thanks to remarkably sophisticated means of 
trafficking and money laundering; a grave economic crisis in much of 
Latin America until the 1980s; and the failure of interdiction to halt more 
than 20 percent of the flow of illegal drugs revealed that pursuing control 
at the source was little more that Sisyphean labor.190 
Over the following decades, U.S. official touted large seizures of enormous 
tonnages of cocaine as successes; however, this simply demonstrates the futility of 
supply-side drug control. Author Bruce Bagley notes that U.S. policy makers based 
supply-side policy on a realist paradigm. Imbedded within this paradigm is a flawed and 
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simplistic assumption that states are the primary actors in the international arena. 
Unfortunately, drug trafficking involves a pantheon of non-state, subnational, business, 
international industry, and individual actors, that act in their own interest regardless of 
laws or policies throughout the Western Hemisphere. The weaker states of Latin 
American do not have control of all territories within their borders. Therefore, just as 
Honduras proclaimed in the 1930s, if the U.S. with the vast wealth and resources at its 
disposal, is unable to cease illicit drug inflow over U.S. borders, and if it is unable to 
address the demand and addiction problems of its society, how can the U.S. expect more 
from Latin America.191 
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V. SUPPLY-SIDE POLICY FAILURE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
One should take a moment to examine why U.S. supply-side tactics have failed. 
The Demand for illicit drugs around the world led to organized crime enterprises built in 
such a way that their internal structure induces violence while allowing expansion despite 
multinational efforts to disrupt them. Furthermore, the counter-terrorist approach to 
subvert organized crime is generally ineffective and proliferates violence. There are many 
forms of organized crime: human trafficking networks, weapons smuggling, and drug 
trafficking are the most well-known. The differentiating factor between them is the 
product being trafficked; they share similar structures, have international domain, and an 
aim to make money. The focus of this section is on drug trafficking, an international 
organized crime institution consisting of multiple internal structures and networks that 
have penetrated Latin American societies and institutions. The “war on drugs” is widely 
hailed as a failure, leaving scholars with many questions. For example, what conditions 
facilitate the expansion of organized crime in the hemisphere? How does the internal 
organization of crime rings intensify their behavior? Is treating organized crime as 
terrorist organizations a good way to reduce violence? Separated into three portions this 
section addresses these questions. The first subsection discusses the basic organization of 
drug trafficking networks and explains how their internal structure is inherently violent. 
The next portion delves deeper into the architecture of drug trafficking entities, 
examining several factors and conditions that lead to their expansion in Latin America. 
Fighting organized crime with counter-terror tactics creates a conflagration of violence; 
the final subsection compares and contrasts organized crime and terror organizations in 
an attempt to determine why this occurs. Examining the structural foundations of drug 
trafficking organizations is paramount to understanding their violent nature and 
survivability. 
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B. STRUCTURE AND VIOLENCE 
There are several ways drug trafficking organizations arrange their internal 
structure. For instance, in Colombia, author Michael Kenney notes that trafficking 
organizations arrange their networks in such a way that maximizes efforts to obtain their 
profit objectives while congruently minimizing exposure to rival crime organizations and 
law enforcement (see Figure 12). These networks derive their core groups from family 
members, close friends, and fellow criminal conspirators. Internal trust is important in 
organized crime. Close connections and subcontracted, redundant networks develop 
overtime through “experience and family ties,” these organizations build their 
“enterprises through contacts, resources, and repeated exchanges while drawing on social 
traditions, such as contraband smuggling, that extend far back into Colombia’s past.”192 
Drug trafficking organizations are large and cover wide areas, therefore they must hire 
“outside” help.  
In some trafficking organizations, these outside recruits must provide personal 
information as collateral. If the organization suspects a recruit of revealing damaging 
information to law enforcement, the trafficking organization will exact reprisals against 
the informant through the application of violence to the applicant’s family. The 
environments that many of these drug trafficking recruits come from are also violent. 
Authors Claudio Beato and Frederico Marinho note Brazil as an example; the violent 
climate there hinders public freedom, weakens individuals sense of security, and 
undermines the ability of external policing mechanisms to provide security. There is a 
“normative subculture” of violence that has engrained itself upon the psyche of organized 
crime participants.193 Many of these participants seek membership in search of physical 
security and group belonging. The recruitment of violent individuals into the drug trade is 
beneficial because the operations of drug trafficking organizations require the use of 
violence. To retain legitimacy in their industry, drug trafficking organizations must 
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protect their territory, operational facilities, and routes; this protection often comes in the 
form of violently eliminating competitors. There are tertiary effects of the drug trade that 
perpetuate violence as well. Author John Bailey notes the overlap of gang violence and 
drug trafficking violence, stating, “Diverse kinds of drug-related violence are projected 
into society… robbery, assault, extortion, or road accidents…” not to mention corruption 
related violence.194 This violence is perpetrated by individuals stealing to pay for drugs 
and gangs robbing or killing rival gangs for retail rights granted by drug trafficking 
organizations. Author Coletta Youngers takes this view of local drug trafficking related 
violence a step further. Youngers notes, those participating in the local drug trade are 
often “paid in drugs rather than cash … sell [these] drugs on local streets [for cash], 
stimulating new markets and illicit drug consumption. [Associated violent crime] 
escalates accordingly.”195 Drug trafficking organizations, by nature, are violent; the 
function of their networks demands it, which perpetuates a violent environment from 
which they also recruit. With a deeper survey of these organizations’ architecture, one 
begins to understand their survivability.196 
C. STRUCTURE AND EXPANSION 
Exploring the Colombian trafficking architecture, there are two general forms of 
networks that aid in survivability. Chain networks consist of independent nodes (see 
Figure 10). Decentralized and self-organizing, these nodes perform specific tasks and 
interact with each other with no central governing authority. The overall accountability of 
this type of group is horizontal in nature. These groups interact “through a series of arm-
length transactions among individual nodes that often coordinate their activities on an ad-
hoc basis.”197 Naturally created in an anarchic system, the lack of central leadership 
leaves the nodes open to infighting. The advantage of this network is that law 
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enforcement’s current headhunting approach allows chain networks to resist the effects of 
losing central leadership; however, a massive blow by law enforcement would require a 
longer recovery period due to no centralized communication, facilitation, and 
reorganization. In contrast, wheel networks have a core collection of managers running 
the overall trafficking operation (see Figure 11). These managers drive and contract 
peripheral functions to different nodes (transportation, distribution, money launderers). 
These structures are heavily reliant on social networks based on family, interpersonal 
relationships, and professional ties. Repetitious interaction generates trust over time. This 
trust and fear of reprisal helps insulate traffickers from law enforcement to some extent. 
Wheel networks’ structure inherently creates mechanisms to share risks decreasing 
destabilization during government interdiction. Core leadership also resolves internode 
disputes, asserting control, thereby reducing rival group thefts and infighting. Both types 
of trafficking arrangements have substantial survivability that allows expansion even 
under constant pressure from law enforcement. To shield themselves from violent 
competitors and law enforcement, traffickers often segment there operations into separate 
working cells that carry out daily functions. Compartmentalized, these cells and nodes 
further reduce the chance of law enforcement infiltration and minimize knowledge of 
other internal operations. Utilizing a need-to-know approach abates the damage a 
detained trafficker can create for the overall operation. There are successes and failures in 
drug trafficking and through learning processes, some groups adapt, while others do not. 
Kenney asserts that organizational learning occurs when the participants within an 
organization learn: “acquiring, interpreting, and applying knowledge and experience.”198 
For organizations to survive and thrive they must gain, store, and apply both techne, 
technical and procedural knowledge as well as metis, intangible skills such as ingenuity, 
cunning, deception, entrepreneurship, and so forth. Traffickers learn the techne of their 
trade through action. Metis is built through mentorship, demonstration, apprenticeship, 
and training. When law enforcement strikes devastating blows, the ability of a trafficking 
organization to regroup, move on, and expand, lies in the complexity of its structure and 
its ability to learn as an organization. An informal institution with no limitations of law, 
                                                 
198 Ibid., 4. 
 85
trafficking organizations can adapt quickly and move forward. If they do not, there are 
always other profit-seeking rivals that will gladly replace them. The prohibition of illicit 
drugs provides the incentive while the hyper-demand for illicit drugs from the U.S. and 
Europe ensures criminal entrepreneurs gain massive trafficking profits. Survivable 
trafficking organizations also rely on law enforcement action to weed out less capable 
competitors, freeing up new markets, while distracting law enforcement attention. Upstart 
trafficking organizations, and even established ones, emulate successful groups. Copying 
successful tactics and doing what works aids in survivability. The fungibility of drugs is 
another survival mechanism; drugs are exchanged for cash, services, and other material 
assets such as real-estate and commodities allowing drug traffickers to expand into new 
markets, maximizing profit while buffering law enforcement’s ability to track and 
prosecute their movements. The bureaucracies of government and law enforcement 
agencies prevent quick changes to procedures and tactics. Less restrained traffickers 
develop innovative strategies, such as narco-submarines, much faster than law 
enforcement agencies can react. Corruption also enables trafficking organization 
expansion.199 
The primary goal of trafficking organizations is to make money. The U.S. 
estimated that in 2003, the global illicit drug trade brought trafficking organizations $320 
billion.200 Drug trafficking organizations have the funds to corrupt government and law 
enforcement officials, and influence “politicians across the political spectrum.”201 This 
corruption undermines Latin American attempts to reform and improve the effectiveness 
of their judicial and law enforcement systems. Arbitrary detentions of low level 
criminals, neglect of due process, and ability of high profile trafficking organization 
leadership to buy their way out of jail sentences, weakens the principles of justice, and 
propagates a lack of trust and sense of hopelessness. The Latin American justice system 
is impotent in its ability to make the costs of the drug trade outweigh the benefits that 
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trafficking provides. The rampant corruption, coupled with the architecture and 
redundancies inherent in the drug trade, allow it to expand regardless of fervent 
counterterrorist strategies employed by government and law enforcement officials.202 
D. ORGANIZED CRIME VERSUS TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
As a testament to survivability, Colombian traffickers, thwarted by U.S. 
interdiction in the Caribbean and Florida, moved their business to Mexico in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Unprecedented levels of violence and bribery marked the occasion. The U.S. 
encouraged the militarization of Mexico’s fight against the drug trade for two reasons. 
The military was recognized as the only viable counter, in respect to resources, 
manpower, and firepower, to the wealthy, powerful, and well-armed drug trafficking 
organizations. The U.S. also recognized that the Mexican military was less corrupt than 
the law enforcement agencies, which were largely in the pockets of drug trafficking 
organizations.203 The principal strategy to combat the drug trade remains supply based; 
eliminate and interrupt the supply to the U.S. and Europe in a manner that will cause the 
prices of drugs to skyrocket, thereby stymying demand and allowing the drug trade to 
collapse. U.S. and Latin American agencies have been fighting the drug war using 
counterterror strategies.  
Unlike the drug organizations that seek monetary profit, terror organizations seek 
political and or policy change through acts of violence. There are cases in the past where 
drug leaders sought political positions and reform; however, these attempts were 
ultimately a means to protect monetary interests. Drug trafficking organizations want to 
maximize profits and minimize exposure to law enforcement attention, where terror 
organizations seek attention and are willing to take risks and inflict dread on civilian 
populations to meet political ends. Regardless their differences, terror groups and drug 
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trafficking networks are arranged similarly, sometimes in horizontal cell structures, but 
often in flat decision-making hierarchies. This structure is often comprised of 
compartmented networks that have the ability to change practices and gather intelligence 
in response to various experiences. Law enforcement agencies employ decapitation 
techniques, targeting drug trafficking leadership. This often results in a brief interruption 
in drug trafficking efforts. The architecture of trafficking groups allows for quick 
recovery through redundant routes, distributors, and the like.204  
Unintended consequences of counterterror techniques include rival organizations’ 
opportunistic and violent attempts to seize power, turf, and customers of the targeted 
group. Wheel network trafficking organizations are vulnerable to head-hunting 
techniques; these groups sometimes concentrate decision making power with few or even 
one key player. Law enforcement groups could severely undermine this style of 
trafficking organization by “dismantling nonredundant nodes and capturing core-group 
leaders.”205 This advice, though sound, comes with a caution. Studies show that 
increased pressure from law enforcement agencies on drug organizations increase drug-
market related violence. For example gangs fight for control of their piece of the drug 
trade, and increased numbers of homicides and robberies as drugs become harder to 
obtain or more expensive. Law enforcement’s current approach to the drug trade 
increases the threat to public safety and health by altering the individual behavior of users 
and dealers and disrupting the overall stability of the drug market’s operation.206  
E. SUPPLY-SIDE CONCLUSIONS 
The global demand for illicit substances fuels the drug trade. Law enforcement’s 
focus on supply based counter-terror tactics against drug traffickers is counter intuitive 
and engenders violence. The differentiating structures of trafficking groups make them 
more or less vulnerable to counterterror tactics. With multiple nodes and leadership 
insulation mechanisms, drug trafficking organizations are designed from within to be 
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naturally survivable. This survival not only depends on redundancy and ingenuity, it 
depends on violence and the willingness and ability to apply it; trafficking organizations 
that strike a balance between these factors often mitigate multinational efforts to disrupt 
their operations and find ways to expand their organization in the face of ever-increasing 
external pressure. Drug trafficking’s main objective will always be the maximization of 
profit. Through corruption, Latin American judicial and law enforcement agencies 
undermine U.S. and Latin American governments’ attempts to make the cost of drug 
trafficking organizations outweigh the profit benefit of their enterprises.  
The 2011 report by the UN Global Commission on Drugs gives several 
suggestions on how to approach the drug war. These suggestions should apply to the 
entire Western Hemisphere, the entire world preferably, in order to maximize total and 
long-term effectiveness. Of note are the suggestions of removing prohibitive laws on 
illicit drugs. The legal regulation and distribution of government subsidized drugs could 
undermine profits of drug trafficking organizations. Free recovery treatment and services 
offered by government agencies could also undermine the demand for illicit drugs. Drug 
laws that cause the incarceration of millions of petty drug users and farmers must be 
revoked and harsh laws preventing prominent drug leaders from purchasing impunity 
must be enacted. Strong preventative youth programs that stimulate a sense of security 
and belonging in a drug free and healthy environment would undercut traffickers’ ability 
to recruit violent group-security seeking youth, thereby reducing the recruitment and 
customer base of the drug trade as a whole. These are a few avenues to confront the drug 
trade, reducing violence and instability in Latin America. Until the anti-drug-trade 
strategy changes from a supply based endeavor to a demand eradication solution, only 




Figure 10.  Drug-trafficking chain network.207 
                                                 




Figure 11.  Drug-trafficking wheel network.208 
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VI. CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICY CHANGE 
A. MODERN EFFECTS OF THE U.S. DRUG WAR  
1. Negative Effects 
There is in-depth research on this subject that already eloquently outlines the 
adverse effects of U.S. policy in Latin America. Perhaps the most influential works come 
from Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin. Their executive summary of Drugs and 
Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy provides an overview of U.S. 
policy influence in Latin America. Youngers and Rosin explain that U.S. drug policies 
have failed to stymy drug production and trafficking, and have simultaneously weakened 
democratic institutions throughout Latin America. U.S. drug policy holds influence over 
Latin American police forces, militaries, and their respective legal and judicial systems. 
Youngers and Rosin explain, “We found that in one nation after another, U.S. drug 
control policies are undermining human rights and democracy and causing enormous 
damage to some of the most vulnerable populations in the hemisphere.”210 In the 1990s, 
U.S. drug policy in Lain America forced a 66 percent reduction in Peruvian coca 
cultivation and a 53 percent reduction in Bolivia.211 What U.S. progress reports often fail 
to mention is that as reduction occurred in those areas, coca cultivation in Colombia 
doubled. Today, the U.S. sees progress in Colombia, where coca production has dropped 
in the last few years. This is actually a failure. As a result of the success in Colombia, 
coca production in neighboring countries, such as Peru, has again skyrocketed bringing 
the plague of the drug trade back to familiar areas and burdening some new regions of 
Latin America. 
The U.S. has historically forced its political will on Latin America. In recent 
years, Rosin and Youngers explain that the U.S. government still uses its diplomatic and 
economic leverage to compel Latin American state to cooperate with U.S. antidrug 
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policies.212 Furthermore, even when U.S. policies are clearly generating significant 
political instability and social conflict, U.S. policy makers fail to adjust policy to mitigate 
the grim realities prevalent in Latin America. Youngers also penned a piece for the 
International Drug Consortium where she summarizes some of U.S. policy effects in 
Latin America and explains how Latin America is beginning to demand drug policy 
reform.213  
2. Latin America Is Looking for a Way Out  
Latin America recognizes that the current drug policies have failed. Over the 
years Latin America has paid a high price for these policies. The prevalent levels of 
violence in Latin America must cease, this is a priority for the region. The drug trade 
feeds organized crime, which is also on the rise and exacerbates violence and corruption 
while eroding democracy. Since Nixon’s drug war began, Latin America has fallen 
deeper into the scourge of the drug trade. Youngers explains,  
Drug dependency—and related health and societal consequences—
continues to spread as trafficking routes multiply, bringing more and more 
Latin Americans into contact with illicit substances. Jails are bursting at 
the seams with low-level drug offenders, causing a serious humanitarian 
crisis, while ineffective or lax law enforcement and corruption ensure that 
few medium or large-scale traffickers end up behind bars.214 
 The rise in organized crime has destabilizing effect in countries with weak law 
enforcement and judicial institutions. Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina sums up 
his views of U.S.–led drug policy 
We have seen that prohibitionism and the war against drugs have not 
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strength, the flow of arms towards Central America from the north has 
grown and deaths in our country have grown. This has forced us to search 
for a more appropriate response.215 
Latin America recognizes current policy failures and has begun seeking alternative drug 
policies. 
In 2009, led by three former presidents; César Gaviria of Colombia; Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso of Brazil; and Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, the Latin American 
Commission on Drugs and Democracy, argued that drug prohibition was responsible for 
generating violent crime and corruption in Latin America. The group exclaims the drug 
war has “failed” and current policies are undermining democracy. For the Latin 
American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, it is time for public debate on 
alternatives to current policy, they suggest treating drug use as an issue of public health 
no criminal law, they have also called for the decriminalization of marijuana.216 
In December 2013, the Uruguayan government passed a law making it the first 
country in the world to legalize recreational marijuana use. After careful deliberation as 
to how the state will enforce the law, President Jose Mujica announced law that will go 
into effect May 6, 2014. Three options of procurement are available to Uruguayan 
citizens. The first option is to purchase up to 40 grams of marijuana per month. Option 
two allows individuals to cultivate their own marijuana plants to produce a maximum of 
480 grams per year. The third option allows co-ops to grow up to 99 plants per group 
with a max of 480 grams per member.217 
Mujica sees this law as a way for his country to mitigate the U.S. led 
prohibitionist war on drugs that has plagued Latin American with violence and crime for 
over 40 years. The U.S. actually provided inspiration to Uruguay in this alternative drug 
policy. Uruguay’s drug czar, Julio Calzada, followed litigation in Colorado and 
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Washington state closely. After these U.S. states passed their recreational marijuana use 
laws in 2012, Julio Calzada was inspired and saw a way out of the rut that prohibitive 
policies had created in his region. Molded after the U.S. state laws, Uruguay’s law 
contains many of the same caveats and conditions, including a home grow provision, 
government-grown plants, and registration and tracking procedures. There are common 
sense provisions as well, Uruguayans cannot drive under the influence and will be subject 
to DUI checkpoints and laws similar to provisions in Washington State.218 
Some U.S. citizens may find other components of the Uruguay laws a bit 
intrusive. In Uruguay, all marijuana users must register with the government so it can 
track use and identify potential abusers. If abuse does occur, the government will enroll 
the abuser into a treatment program. Uruguayans have access to high-quality government 
marijuana at $1 per gram; this is much cheaper than buying it from the illicit market.219 
The Uruguayan government believes that these new laws will allow its police 
force to focus its attention on violent crime and thwarting harder drug smugglers. Other 
Latin American countries who face drug rings funded by illicit trafficking, are 
considering similar laws. The presidents of Colombia and Guatemala are in favor of 
legalizing some illicit substances; however, they assert that their efforts can only be part 
of an international program. If not, drug traffickers would simply move to a country 
where it is illegal, further intensifying the violence and crime in that nation. If the effort 
to legalize illicit substances is not completed in concert, drug rings will not fade away, 
simply adapt to the situation and devour states too stubborn to change. Conservative 
voices, especially in the U.S., have blocked such a combined effort to date. Whether the 
U.S. realizes it or not, our efforts have a great impact in Latin America. Colorado and 









Clearly, the situation in Latin America deserves more U.S. attention. If U.S. drug policy 
change can help reduce drug problems in the U.S. and Latin America, serious debate and 
consideration of policy change must occur.220  
B. TO REFORM OR NOT TO REFORM 
1. U.S. Domestic Intransigence 
U.S. policy makers have shown a history of intransigence when it comes to 
domestic drug policy. In 1989, the RAND Corporation established the Drug Policy 
Research Center to conduct empirical research of U.S. drug policy. A study as early as 
1995 indicated that U.S. drug policies could have devastating effects on Latin America, 
particularly Mexico.221 In his RAND paper, “Evaluating the Effectiveness of Interdiction 
and Source Country Control,” author Johnathan Caulkins explained, “under plausible 
circumstances, increasing interdiction increases the quantity and value of drug exports, 
thereby increases revenues for drug suppliers in the source country, which presumably is 
undesirable.”222 In fact, Caulkins explained, that U.S. policy would also affect other 
nations within Latin America. He clarified that operations such as Blast Furnace may be 
somewhat effective in the short term, but by putting American troops on foreign soil 
would breed resentment.223 Caulkins highlighted the fact that our increased aerial and 
maritime scrutiny of trafficking led to an increase in overland transport through Mexico. 
Caulkins recognized that such a large influx of drug activity exposed Mexico to a 
possible conflagration of violence and corruption. He added, “The U.S. clearly has an 
interest in not having its neighbor and significant trading partner suffer the turmoil that 
has plagued some source countries, such as Colombia.”224 One can see the increase in 
                                                 
220 “How Will Uruguay’s Marijuana Law Work,” The Economist, August 1, 2013, accessed May 6, 
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violence that the drug trade has brought to Mexico over the last couple of decades. 
Despite the role U.S. policy has played in this destabilization, policy makers have failed 
to consider changing their drug war methods to an extent that would make a difference 
and mitigate some of the negative effects pushed upon Latin America.  
Author Dana Priest explains that throughout the 1980s, into the 1990s, the U.S. 
was not only revived its drug war but was fighting a secret war, using Special Forces, 
attempting to move Latin America from dictatorships to democracies. This fact alone left 
a bad connotation for American military in the region. Priest explains that by the mid-
1990s. Many of the dictatorships on Latin America transitioned to democracies. This 
peace was great for Latin America, not so great for U.S. Southern Command. 
“Washington and the Pentagon had concluded that no war anywhere in the region would 
threaten U.S. national security—good news in any other part of the government, but for 
the CinC it meant struggling to stay relevant.”225 General Charles Wilhelm found a way 
to stay in the game. He petitioned Congress to increase Southern Command’s role in 
Latin America.226 Priest explains that at the time the widespread cocaine problem 
plaguing America could not be ignored.  
As part of the H. W. Bush drug war revival, Congress voted to allow Southern 
Command to combat the drug war. The fact the Washington was going to allow Southern 
Command to use military action against drug trafficking was ill received by many nations 
in Latin America. These nations desperately wanted help alleviating the drug problem but 
U.S. military intervention seemed an unlikely remedy. Panama for instance, according to 
Priest, loathed the idea so, that it expelled U.S. Southern Command from Panama in 
1997. It did not stop there; the Panamanians exhumed the bodies of fallen U.S. service 
members and sent them home. Southern Command continues to use the “War on Drugs” 
to widen the U.S. military’s influence in Latin America. In recent forums with senior 
military leaders, U.S. Southern Command touts impressive statistics of narcotics 
interdictions with limited assets. It is true; U.S. Southern Command does an outstanding 
job carrying out current U.S. policies with extremely limited assets. That said, many of 
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the recent military-to-military relations are doing wonders for diplomatic relationships 
and security building throughout Latin America; however, the intransigent focus on 
supply-side tactics limits the U.S. from developing and enacting a successful policy to 
curb the global drug problem. Some alternative ideas come to light from time to time, but 
Congress has made no real attempts at policy change.227 
In a hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, Internal Affairs, and 
Criminal Justice in February 1997, Secretary Shalala reported to Congress that review of 
several studies showed that needle exchange programs “can be an effective component of 
a comprehensive strategy to prevent HIV and other blood borne infectious diseases in 
communities that choose to include them.”228 Secretary Shalala also directed the Health 
and Human Services science departments to continue reviewing research regarding the 
effect of needle exchange programs on illegal drug use. Research showed that  
needle exchange programs do not encourage illegal drug use and can, in 
fact, be part of a comprehensive public health strategy to reduce drug use 
through effective referrals to drug treatment and counseling. [In Fact,] “An 
exhaustive review of the science in this area indicates that needle 
exchange programs can be an effective component of the global effort to 
end the epidemic of HIV disease,” said Harold Varmus, M.D., Director of 
the National Institutes of Health [(NIH)]. NIH has funded much of the 
research into the effectiveness of needle exchange programs and their 
impact on drug use. “Recent findings have strengthened the scientific 
evidence that needle exchange programs do not encourage the use of 
illegal drugs.”229  
Despite research showing the benefits of such programs, lawmakers, such as 
Dennis Hastert, explain that needle exchange programs were unfounded moral 
compromises and were both ineffective in halting heroin addiction or the spread of AIDS. 
The representative sighted similar programs’ failure in Switzerland. Hastert explained 
“The war on drugs must be thought of in one way and one way only, as a war for the very 
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lives of our children.”230 Such a program in the U.S., according to Hastert, would simply 
be destructive and merely amount to experimentation on U.S. children. 
A congressional debate on alternatives to prohibitive policies began in June of 
1999. The first of its kind since 1988, Congress held a hearing to discuss the pros and 
cons of drug legalization, decriminalization, and harm reduction. It was apparent 
Congress believed the legalization of drugs was the ultimate goal of people who actively 
promote medicinal marijuana or advocate government funded heroin supplied to addicts 
to prevent the spread of AIDS. A New York Times article explained that,  
The hearing illustrated Congress’s reluctance to rethink the war against 
drugs, on which the Federal Government spends nearly $18 billion a year. 
And it presaged the sort of discourse about drugs bound to surface in next 
year’s election campaign. “It’s a politically risk-free area,” said Eric E. 
Sterling, a former counsel to the House Judiciary Committee who helped 
draft the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts passed in 1986 and 1988. Mr. Sterling, 
who is president of the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, attended the 
hearing. “No member of Congress is going to lose a vote because they’re 
tough on drugs,” he said. “And it attracts media attention. I suspect 
pollsters would tell members of Congress that this is a very good area to 
be outspoken in.”231 
There were several arguments for and against legalization, decriminalization and the like. 
Opposing camps jostled back and forth 
We do not have hearings called “The Pros and Cons of Rape,” said 
Representative Mark Souder, Republican of Indiana, a member of the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, 
which held the hearing. And Ethan A. Nadelmann, the director of the 
Lindesmith Center, a group based in New York that works to change drug 
policy, dismissed the hearing as “an effort to smear the many moderate 
proposals for drug-policy reform with the broad and false brush of radical 
legalization.” … In his testimony, General McCaffrey described a 
campaign of deception and half-truths to erode society’s disapproval of 
marijuana and harder drugs, to which 4.1 million Americans are now 
addicted. While 82 percent of the public oppose making illicit drugs legal, 
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he said, there is “a carefully camouflaged, well-funded, tightly knit core of 
people whose goal is to legalize drugs in the United States.’… 
“Legalization is a surrender to despair,” said Representative Benjamin A. 
Gilman, Republican of upstate New York. “It cannot and ought not be any 
topic of serious discussion in our nation’s debate of the challenges of illicit 
drugs.” … Mr. Nadelmann was one of several people whom General 
McCaffrey accused of advocating drug legalization. General McCaffrey 
quoted Mr. Nadelmann as having said in 1990, “Personally, when I talk 
about legalization, I mean three things: the first is to make drugs such as 
marijuana, cocaine and heroin legal.” The rest of Mr. Nadelmann’s 
sentence, which was omitted at the hearing, said “. . . under fairly 
restricted conditions, but not as restricted as today.’232 
Advocates for decriminalization explained that prison overpopulation was a result 
of the punitive and prohibitive nature of U.S. domestic policy. In a hearing one month 
later, Chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. John H. Mica acknowledged that a many state 
and federal prisoners were indeed there because of drug related issues; however, they had 
also committed crimes of a more carnal nature. The hearing went on and ultimately 
determined that policy change was not a viable alternative at that time.233  
In 1999, a report processed by the Executive Office of the President concluded: 
Here at home the last two youth drug use rates have leveled off and in 
many cases are now in decline (this marks a sharp departure from the prior 
six years, which saw the number of our children doing drugs steadily 
increase). Overall drug use in the United States is now half it was in the 
1970s. During the same period cocaine use has fallen by 75 percent. Drug 
related murders have reached their lowest point in over a decade.  
On the international front, cocaine production in Bolivia and Peru has 
decreased by 300 metric tons over the last four years [There is no mention 
of the increase of coca cultivation in Colombia]. We have built a common 
consensus against drugs. We have eliminated the distinction between 
producer and consumer nations, and built a common understanding that 
drugs threaten all nations. Working with the rest of the international 
community, we have built strong counter-drug cooperation through the 
United Nations, and within this hemisphere through the Organization of 
American States. 
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These advances provide a solid foundation upon which to build. Clearly, 
the answer is not to make dangerous, addictive substances more available 
or to drop our societal guard. Instead, we must focus on prevention, 
treatment, enforcement, interdiction and international cooperation. In other 
words, we must remain focused on those things that we know work.234 
This sentiment persists today. 
2. A Renewed Look at Alternatives 
More recently, the issue of drug policy change has again gained traction. Several 
states have decriminalized marijuana and several sources of literature study the 
ramifications of legalization. A 2010, RAND study loosely estimates that the state of 
California could garner as much as $1.49 billion dollars and year by taxing marijuana, in 
a similar, but more expensive way to cigarettes. That said marijuana consumption could 
rise by as much as 98 percent.235  
Such a policy could have an effect on the illicit marijuana industry in Mexico. 
Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), earn around $2 billion a year by 
selling marijuana in the U.S. The RAND Corporation believes that legalization would 
eliminate as much as $215 million in illicit DTO revenue. Even under a state tax, legal 
marijuana would be no more expensive than illegal marijuana, and in fact, contain higher 
levels of THC (purer). The illicit Mexican stream of marijuana to underage consumers 
would cease when adults started illegally providing underage consumers with the legal 
product, which would be cheaper, subject to stricter safety parameters, and all around a 
better product. “Mexican DTOs will have no more competitive advantage than they 
would trying to sell alcohol and cigarettes to California youth today.”236 Eventually, if 
other states followed the same legalization path as California, RAND estimates that all 
illicit revenue for DTOs would dry up. That said, RAND assesses that if revenues from  
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illicit trafficking decreases in Mexican DTOs, Mexican violence may initially increase 
with an overall decrease within a few years. This study is another indicator of how U.S. 
domestic policy can affect events in Latin America237 
Many drug reform proponents use analogies of prohibition or drug legalization 
programs in other countries as a way to forecast what such a program in the U.S. would 
look like. The authors, Robert J. MacCoun and Peter Reuter, have compiled a book that 
takes a close look at the pros and cons of the U.S. drug policy change. The following 
tables are a list of analogies that are commonly used in drug forums with a brief 
description of lessons learned in each case.  
 
Table 1.   Legal control of other drugs and vices238 
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238 MacCoun, Drug War Heresies, 301.  
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Table 2.   Legal control of other drugs and vices (cont.)239 
MacCoun and Reuter make an effort to be “honest brokers,” but the fact is they 
see a policy that is effectively doing more harm than good. In the final pages of Drug 
War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times, & Places, the authors summarize their 
findings: 
Increased treatment and prevention, even under the most generous 
scenarios, will not solve the U.S. drug problem. It is doubtful that a 
complete “solution” exists. The pursuit of a drug-free society seems 
quixotic, and its nobility is tarnished by the associated hatred and 
contempt for drug users. Defenders of the current regime deliberately 
avert their eyes from an honest assessment of a massive and frequently 
cruel intervention that sacrifices so many other goals for the one 
desiderata of drug abstinence. Society is forgoing significant reductions in 
drug-related damage by its unwillingness to make policy changes that risk 
sending the wrong message.240  
These men, MacCoun and Reuter, offer 11 propositions that they believe may be viable 
policy alternatives. Below their propositions have been reproduced verbatim:  
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A. Elimination of criminal sanctions for drug possession (i.e., 
depenalization) 
1. Reductions in criminal sanctioning have little or no effect on the 
prevalence of drug use (i.e., the number of users), at least relative 
to the existing levels of enforcement. The basis for this proposition 
is stronger for cannabis than for cocaine or heroin.  
2. It seems plausible that reductions in criminal sanctioning might 
produce minor increases in intensity (units consumed per user), 
though direct evidence on this point is limited. 
3. Reductions in criminal sanctioning, almost by definition, produce 
significant reductions in the criminal justice costs, burdens, and 
intrusiveness associated with those sanctions.  
4. Reductions in the criminal sanctioning per se have little effect on 
drug-related harms involving health and impaired functioning. 
 
B. Increases in legal access to a drug (partial or total legalization) 
 
1. Allowing some form of legal access to a drug increases the 
prevalence and intensity of its use. (In the terms of Chapter 5, the 
combined impact of price reductions, increased availability, 
decreased legal risks, and reduced symbolic threshold outweighs 
the reduced impact of the forbidden fruit and stigmatization 
effects.) 
2. Allowing some form of legal access to a drug eliminates some 
types of harm (those entirely attributable to prohibition, including 
criminal sanctioning costs, loss of liberty, and so on), and 
substantially reduces some other types of harm (income-generating 
crimes, needle sharing, and some overdoses. 
3. Legal access to a drug may curtail, but will not eliminate, those 
harms per use attributable to the psychoactive properties or 
behavioral effects of a drug (e.g., addictive potential, intoxication, 
impaired functioning, and drug side effects). Any increase in 
prevalence or intensity of consumption will increase the aggregate 
impact of these harms. 
4. Commercial promotion leads to a greater expansion in drug use 
than mere legal accessibility. 
5. Growth in drug use under expanded legal access can be limited or 
prevented by sufficiently strict regulatory or prescription barriers, 
but commercial providers will aggressively resist most such 
barriers.  
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6. Strict regulatory or prescription barriers within a regime of legal 
access will reproduce many harms of a prohibition regime (B2), 
unless they can selectively target the heaviest users (addicts). 
7. If relaxed drug laws increase the prevalence of use (B1), the 
additional users will, on average, use less heavily and less 
harmfully than those who would have also have used drugs under 
prohibition (composition effect). (This proposition is purely 
theoretical; there is little direct evidence.) 241 
In Tables 1 and 2 above, one can see that in each instance of prohibitive 
analogies, vice use decreases but does not cease, and a black market emerges. The growth 
of the drug market is bad for the U.S. and Latin America. From the RAND studies above 
one can garner the results of a U.S. policy change in Latin America. If MacCoun and 
Reuter’s policies move forward, one could expect drug trafficking to become less 
profitable and diminish over time. MacCoun and Reuter also give a summary of 
projections observable in Table 3.   
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Table 3.   Summary of projections.242 
A 2011 report by the Global Commission on Drug Policy (GCDP) also recognizes 
the failure of supply-side drug control tactics. It explains that from its perspective, the 
U.S. and others have wasted billions of dollars on criminalization and repressive 
measures focused on producers, traffickers, and consumers of illicit substances because 
they have failed to reduce both drug supply and consumption.243 As mentioned above, an 
apparent victory in eliminating one source of drugs or dismantling one trafficking 
organization proves fruitless due to the almost instant appearance of other sources and 
traffickers. Repressive and punitive measures directed at consumers encumber public 
health measures to reduce overdose fatalities, HIV and AIDS, and other harmful drug 
consumption side effects. According to the GCDP report, “Government expenditures on 
futile supply reduction strategies and incarceration displace more cost-effective and 
evidence-based investments in demand and harm reduction.”244 The commission outlines 
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several principles and recommendations for policy reforms. What follows touches the 
wave tops of a more in-depth study of desired principles of new drug policy and 
recommendations for said policies. 
Principles: 
1. Drug policies must be based on solid empirical and scientific evidence. 
The primary measures of success should be the reduction of harm to the 
health, security and welfare of individuals and society.           
2. Drug policies must be based on human rights and public health 
principles. We should end the stigmatization and marginalization of 
people who use certain drugs and those involved in the lower levels of 
cultivation, production and distribution, and treat people dependent on 
drugs as patients, not criminals. 
3. The development and implementation of drug policies should be a 
global shared responsibility, but also needs to take into consideration 
diverse political, social and cultural realities. Policies should respect the 
rights and needs of people affected by production, trafficking and 
consumption, as explicitly acknowledged in th e1988 Convention on Drug 
Trafficking. 
4. Drug policies must be pursued in a comprehensive manner, involving 
families, schools, public health specialists, development practitioners and 
civil society leaders, in partnership with law enforcement agencies and 
other relevant governmental bodies.245 
Recommendations: 
1. Break the taboo. Pursue an open debate and promote policies that 
effectively reduce harms related to drug use and drug control policies. 
Increase investment in research and analysis into the impact of different 
policies and programs. 
2. Replace the criminalization and punishment of people who use drugs 
with the offer of health and treatment services to those who need them. 
3. Encourage experimentation by governments with models of legal 
regulation of drugs (with cannabis, for example) that are designed to 
undermine the power of organized crime and safeguard the health and 
security of their citizens. 
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4. Establish better metrics, indicators and goals to measure progress. 
5. Challenge rather than reinforce common misconceptions about drug 
markets, drug use and drug dependence. 
6. Countries that continue to invest mostly in a law enforcement approach 
(despite the evidence) should focus their repressive actions on violent 
organized crime and drug traffickers, in order to reduce the harms 
associated with the illicit drug market. 
7. Promote alternative sentences for small-scale and first-time drug 
dealers. 
8. Invest more resources in evidence-based prevention, with a special 
focus on youth. 
9. Offer a wide and easily accessible range of options for treatment and 
care for drug dependence, including substitution and heroin-assisted 
treatment, with special attention to those most at risk, including those in 
prisons and other custodial settings.  
10. The United Nations system must provide leadership in the reform of 
global drug policy. This means promoting an effective approach based on 
evidence, supporting countries to develop drug policies that suit their 
context and meet their needs, and ensuring coherence among various UN 
agencies, policies and conventions. 
11. Act urgently: the war on drugs has failed, and policies need to change 
now.246 
This section discussed U.S. intransigence on drug policies and possible alternative 
approaches to the global war on drugs. There are many reasons for the U.S.’s resistance 
to change, which is a topic that merits a thesis in itself. There is a need for change, 
regardless of how much one may want to think that U.S. policies are solving the drug 
problem, they are not. As a close neighbor and economic partner the U.S. must also 
consider the effects of our domestic policies on Latin American states more closely.  
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C. THE WAY AHEAD 
1. A Multi-faceted Approach 
Latin America is a region of great economic growth and potential. Its economic 
strength and diversity significantly compliments U.S. fiscal interests in the Western 
Hemisphere. Although a positive economic trend is developing in Latin America, the 
U.S. must consider its drug policies’ destabilizing effects, as not to further inhibit 
development throughout Latin America. After careful study, empirical data suggests that 
there is an opportunity for Latin American states to gain economic strength and therefore 
gain an increased ability to fund internal security programs throughout the region. Latin 
American states have begun to address regional security concerns through its 
participation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which seeks 
to combat transnational organized crime by increasing government security and 
interoperability between member states.247 Targeting transnational organized crime and 
corruption alone will not solve security shortfalls in Latin America. Alternative drug 
control policies mentioned above may also help stabilize and improve the situation in 
Latin America. In addition to improving the domestic and international conditions by 
seeking alternative drug policies, the U.S. will also benefit in its participation as an equal 
partner in job creation and infrastructure strengthening throughout Latin America; this 
combined with UNODC efforts will improve transnational security and help reinforce 
economic stability in the region.  
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Table 4.   World economy rankings248 
Backed by the Obama administration, Arturo Valenzuela (Assistant Secretary, 
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs) believes that “United States has important 
national interests at stake in the Western Hemisphere, and the best way to advance these 
interests is through proactive engagement with all of the countries of the Americas.”249 
Economic exchange and a strong equal-partner approach on security by the United States 
with Latin America will foster growth within the Latin American states and increase 
security throughout the region. U.S. policy currently, though not the only factor, 
encumbers the full potential of Latin American states. That said, Latin America is on the 
right path to increased internal stability, through transnational security cooperation and 
practices that nurture economic growth.  
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2. Economic Considerations 
Seven Latin American states are among the top 50 economies in the world. Brazil, 
ranked sixth, is the largest economy in Latin America (see Table 4). Latin American 
states have robust, burgeoning economies. This region’s economic growth during a time 
of global economic crisis is a testament to its fiscal stability. Assistant Secretary Arturo 
Valenzuela noted in testimony to the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Peace 
Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that 
“Not only did the region avoid the worst effects of the financial crisis, but current growth 
rates [were] projected to exceed 4 percent [in 2011].”250 
 
Table 5.   Gross domestic product in $billions 2008–12 growth.251 
On average, with the exception of Venezuela, the economies within Latin 
America experienced an increase between 2008 and 2011 (see Table 5). All Latin 
American states experienced economic growth, up to 10.6 percent (Panama), in 2011. By 
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Country             GDP 2008 GDP 2009 GDP 2010 GDP 2011 AVE. GDP
Brazil 1653 1622 2143 2477 1974 2.6
Mexico 1094 880 1035 1153 1041 3.9
Argentina 327 307 369 446 362 8.9
Venezuela, RB 316 329 394 316 339 4.2
Colombia 244 234 286 333 274 5.9
Chile 180 173 216 249 205 6
Peru 127 127 154 177 146 6.8
Cuba 61 .. .. .. 61 2.1* *03‐07
Ecuador 54 52 58 66 58 7.8
Dominican Republic 46 47 52 56 50 4.5
Guatemala 39 38 41 47 41 3.9
Uruguay 30 30 39 47 37 5.7
Costa Rica 30 29 36 41 34 4.2
Panama 23 24 27 27 25 10.6
El Salvador 21 21 21 23 22 1.5
Bolivia 17 17 20 24 20 5.2
Paraguay 17 14 18 24 18 6.9
Honduras 14 14 15 17 15 3.6
Nicaragua 8 8 8 9 8 5.1
Haiti 6 6 7 7 7 5.6
Growth % 2008‐2012 
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comparison, the U.S. experienced economic growth of only 1.7 percent in 2011.252 One 
of the greatest contributing factors to Latin America’s economic growth and stability is 
international Trade.  
Mexico and Brazil are among the top importers and exporters in the world (see 
Table 6). The top three recipients of Brazil’s exports are the European Union (EU), 
China, and the U.S. respectively. 253 Brazil receives most of its imports from the EU, 
U.S., and China respectively. Mexico’s main customer is the U.S. with the EU and China 
close behind.254 The U.S. provides the majority of Mexico’s imports and in most Latin 
American states, the U.S. is the top Importer and Exporter.255 Some states such as 
Paraguay and Uruguay have the U.S. as their number five importer.256 Surprisingly, Cuba 
has the U.S. as its third largest importer.257 A healthy international trade system has 
advanced the economies of the Latin American states. Although some Latin American 
states are still developing their trade institutions, the region has established its presence in 
the global economy. In 2009, total trade within the Western Hemisphere reached $1.9 
Trillion.258 U.S. exports to the Caribbean and Latin America “reached $524 billion and 
40 percent of Latin America and the Caribbean’s exports flowed to the United States, 
making [the U.S.] the region’s single largest export destination.”259 Because of the level 
of economic entanglement, removing the instability caused by current supply side 
policies and bolstering trade relationships and cooperation with Latin America, will allow 
the United States to increase the security and stability of the region. Continued trade and 
economic participation, perhaps through new drug policies in the region, will allow the 
economy of the entire Western Hemisphere to flourish.  
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Table 6.   World import / export rankings260 
3. Stability 
Some Latin American states do not share in the same levels of prosperity and 
stability as their neighbors (i.e., Honduras, El Salvador, and Haiti). However, Latin 
American nations are concerting efforts with the U.S. and the UNODC to increase 
stability throughout those territories. Such efforts can be seen by the adoption of a “draft 
resolution (CTOC/COP/2012/L.4/Rev.2) sponsored by Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, the European Union, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and the United 
States,” on 19 October 2012.261 Though still in the beginning stages of implementation, 
the UNODC has established “an effective and comprehensive approach to transnational 
organized crime and drug trafficking.”262 The UNODC is also reaching out to regional 
                                                 
260 The World Trade Organization, “Technical Notes.”  
261 United Nations, Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime: CTOC/COP/2012/15, October 2012, accessed January 20, 2013, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/COP6/CTOC_COP_2012_15/CTOC_COP_20
12_15_E.pdf, 24. 
262 Ibid., 3. 
Country Trade export Country Trade import
Mexico 16 Mexico 16
Brazil 22 Brazil 21
Venezuela, RB 42 Chile 43
Argentina 44 Argentina 44
Chile 46 Colombia 51
Colombia 55 Venezuela, RB 53
Peru 58 Peru 58
Ecuador 69 Ecuador 68
Panama 76 Panama 73
Costa Rica 90 Dominican Republic 79
Guatemala 91 Guatemala 80
Dominican Republic 96 Costa Rica 82
Bolivia 98 Cuba 86
Uruguay 100 Paraguay 88
Honduras 101 Uruguay 90
Cuba 103 Honduras 92
Paraguay 110 El Salvador 94
El Salvador 112 Bolivia 104
Nicaragua 130 Nicaragua 124
Haiti 157 Haiti 141
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and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) the private sector and civilians 
to strengthen “cooperation and work with States parties to the Convention and the 
Protocols thereto in order to achieve their full implementation.”263  
 
 
Table 7.   U.S. 2011264 and intentional homicides 2009–11 per 100,000265  
The U.S. should seek to cooperate not only within the UNODC but also with as 
many individual Latin American states as possible. Current U.S. drug policies neglect the 
differing situations of individual Latin American countries. The U.S. should base its 
approach on not only political norms and economic relationships but also empirical data. 
                                                 
263 Ibid, 5. 
264 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the United States, 2011, 
data tables, Table 6, accessed January 20, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/download-printable-files. 



































Instability in some Latin America states could stem from relatively low GDP per capita 
rates, high intentional homicide rates. Much of these statistics are contributable to the 
side effects of the illicit trade, which U.S. drug policies currently intensify. The flow of 
immigrants into the U.S. highlights this instability. The U.S. should consider this when 
formulating an effective approach to building stability in the region.  
 
Table 8.   GDP per capita  
a. Security 
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) cite 
that the:  
Persistently high homicide and crime rates throughout Central America, 























symptoms of a broader climate of insecurity throughout the region. Crime 
and violence are aggravated by widespread poverty and unemployment.266  
There is a correlation between instability and poor quality of life and high 
intentional homicide rates. One should note, however, that Mexico’s homicide rate is 
22.7 per 100,000, which is less than New Orleans’ homicide rate of 23.7 per 100,000 (see 
Table 7). There is also a high correlation between illicit drug activity and violence in each 
of these cities. U.S. cities, such as those listed in Table 7, which face some of the highest 
intentional homicide rates on the continent, also endure high levels of poverty.267 A 
relative indication of individual contribution to the overall GDP, help one to understand 
some of the economic hardship experienced in the region. The GDP per Capita in the 
United States is $48,112.00.268 Chile has the highest GDP per capita in Latin America, 
$14,394.00, (see Table 7) which is less than a third of the GDP per capita of the U.S.269 
The GINI coefficients of Latin American states also help to demonstrate the disparity or 
unequal distribution of wealth in the region (see Table 11). The U.S. has a GINI index of 
40.8. 270 The higher the index, the worst disparity there is between the wealthy and the 
poor. There is a large middle class in America, approximately 80 percent by some 
accounts, which contrasts with Latin America.271 Many states in Latin America have a 
wealthy population and a poverty stricken population, with a relatively miniscule group 
of middle class as a buffer between. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) defines the middle class as “households with income between  
 
                                                 
266 U.S. Department of State, Security Challenges in Latin America, 2012, accessed January 21, 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/187097.htm. 
267 U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, “Poverty and Shared Households by State: 
2011,” American Community Survey Briefs, accessed January 21, 2013, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acsbr11-05.pdf. 
268 The World Bank, Data, “GDP per Capita (Current U.S. $),” accessed Jan 19, 2013, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. 
269 Ibid. 
270 UN data, “Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index,” accessed January 24, 2013, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ihdi. 
271 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Latin American Economic Outlook 
2011: How Middle-Class Is Latin America?, 2011, accessed January 24, 2013, 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/argentina/latinamericanin2011howmiddle-classislatinamerica.htm, 78. 
 118
50% and 150% of the national median.”272 Latin American middle classes range from as 
high as 56 percent of the population in Uruguay to under 40 percent in Bolivia and 
Colombia.273 The worst GINI index belongs to Haiti at 59.9 (no data exists for Cuba, see 
Table 12). Small GDP per capita, coupled with a high disparity between the wealthy and 
poor in Latin America have contributed to the instability in the region. A renewed drug 
policy could help improve the quality of life for subsistence farmers and perhaps bolster 
and increase the economic base of the Latin American middle class.  
 
Table 9.   Life expectancy and literacy rates 2009–2011274 
                                                 
272 Ibid., 57. 
273 Ibid. 
274 The World Bank, Data, “Life expectancy at birth, total (years),” accessed Jan 19, 2013, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN. 
Country Lit Rate Country  Life exp
Cuba (2010) 100 Chile (2011) 79
Chile (2009) 99 Costa R (2011) 79
Argentina (2010) 98 Cuba (2011) 79
Uruguay (2010) 98 Mexico (2010) 77
Costa Rica (2010) 96 Argent (2011) 76
Venezuela, RB (2009 96 Ecuador (2011) 76
Panama (2010) 94 Pana (2011) 76
Paraguay (2010) 94 Urugu (2010) 76
Colombia (2009) 93 Colomb (2011) 74
Mexico (2010) 93 Nicara (2011) 74
Ecuador (2010) 92 Peru (2011) 74
Bolivia (2009) 91 VeNZL (2010) 74
Brazil (2009) 90 Brazil (2011) 73
Dominican R. (2010) 90 Domin R (2011) 73
Honduras (2010) 85 Hond (2011) 73
El Salvador (2010) 84 El Sal (2011) 72
Guatemala (2010) 75 Paragu (2011) 72
Haiti not avail Guate (2011) 71
Nicaragua not avail Bolivia (2011) 67
Peru not avail Haiti (2011) 62
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b. Unemployment 
Unemployment in Latin America is also a destabilizing factor that must be 
considered. Recent unemployment rates are not readily available. However, the 
unemployment rates from 2005 show that unemployment in some states reached 20.05 
percent (see Table 10).275 Since 2005, some Latin American states, such as Mexico, have 
improved their employment situation. Unemployment can also cause instability in the 
population as people relocate to find work. Joblessness and the lack of economic options 
also contribute to the choices one makes when the ability to provide for loved ones is 
called into question. Many transnational crime organizations can offer an economic 
incentive to the downtrodden to remedy their present situation. The drug trade provides 
incentives to some, from farmers to unemployed young men. Others are forced to migrate 
from their homes to avoid the violence perpetrated by local drug traffickers.  
 
Table 10.   Immigration flow into the U.S. (2000–2011)276 
The INL is focusing efforts on “assistance programs, from traditional prevention, 
law enforcement and counternarcotic programs, to anti-corruption, judicial reform, anti-
gang, community policing, and corrections efforts.”277 These are all necessary steps that 
will increase the region’s internal security and help build a foundation for governments to 
begin solidifying control and ensuring safety of their respective citizenry. Alternative 
drug policies can help provide jobs for Latin American communities and stymy the 
violence of drug trafficking organizations as they begin to deteriorate. Such policies 
                                                 
275 UN data, “Unemployment Rate,” accessed January 24, 2013, 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Unemployment+Rate&d=GenderStat&f=inID%3a121. 
276 Ibid., 5, Table 3. 
277 U.S. Department of State, “Security Challenges in Latin America” (Washington, DC: March 29, 
2012), accessed January 21, 2013, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/187097.htm. 
Country  immig (00) immig (11) % ↑
Honduras 160 k 380 k 132
Ecuador 110 k  210 k 83
Guatemala 290 k  520 k 82
El Salvador 430 k 660 k 55
Mexico 4.6 M 6.8 M 45
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come to the minds of many Latin American leaders as they try to further their countries’ 
development. New policies will also help answer the transnational organized crime 
problem; however, the challenges of job creation and economic disparity must be 
addressed to form lasting improvements in Latin American security. Alternative drug 
control policies are a possible solution that U.S. and Latin American leaders must 
consider. To solidify success in the region there must be a focused effort by the United 
States to collaborate with Latin America and build enduring programs and institutions 
that encourage “upward social mobility” and minimize the susceptibility of the middle 
class to adverse economic strains such as unemployment or a household’s sudden loss of 
the main provider.278 
 
Table 11.   Unemployment rates (2005) 
c. Immigration 
Although most Latin American States have literacy rates above 90 percent (which 
can be correlated to a stable education system) and through good healthcare systems 
enjoy life expectancy rates as high as 79 years (see Table 9), there has been a historical 
flow of immigrants into the U.S. from Latin America in search of safety and 
employment. There is also a correlation between high homicide rates (see Table 7) and 
                                                 















high immigration flow into the U.S. (see Table 10). Despite the relatively steady flow of 
immigrants into the U.S., there has been little change to the number of illegal immigrants 
from 2010 to 2011.279 Although there was an increase of immigration since 2000, the 
illegal immigrant population has not shown appreciable growth since 2007 due to 
relatively high U.S. unemployment and marked economic improvement in states such as 
Mexico.280 The stabilization of illegal immigration rate into the U.S. testifies to the effect 
that improved economic conditions and the job market can effect one’s decision to leave 
or remain in one’s country. Favorable economic conditions and job availability play a 
huge role in the overall stability and security within a community. The U.S. should 
approach Latin American states as an equal partner and seek out ways to increase the 
standard of living of Latin Americans through job creation.  
A change in drug policy may also have an effect on immigration policy. There are 
diplomatic benefits to the application of new drug policy, as it may increase the economic 
and security stability of our Latin American neighbors. The ramifications of such policies 
and relevant programs amount to political capital that will pay dividends down the road 
as the U.S. negotiates trade and other international level policies. New drug policy can 
help develop a safer situation within Latin America, the economic benefits from such 
policy will also improve the economies within the U.S. and Latin America; as this 
transpires further development of infrastructure and institutions will occur. Infrastructure 
and institution building will not only further increase security throughout Latin America; 
it will provide a job market. With employment more readily available, a more favorable 
and sustainable economic situation will result. Combined with alternative drug policies, 
this new situation in Latin America will reduce the economic influence of drug traffickers 
and transnational organized crime thereby increasing the overall stability and security of 
the region. 
                                                 
279 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Estimates of the 
Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011, 2012, 1, accessed 
January 19, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/estimates-unauthorized-immigrant-population-residing-united-
states-january-2011. 
280 Ibid., 1. 
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Table 12.   GINI coefficient or index 281 
4. Summary 
Current and future interaction with the Latin American states presents a unique 
opportunity to build stronger economic partnerships and strengthen security throughout 
the western hemisphere. U.S. drug policy should consider our neighbors individual 
situations. Empirical information on progress in the region elucidates the fact that Latin 
American states are on a positive upward trend in economic growth; this provides an 
excellent opportunity to revamp U.S. drug policy. Interaction of Latin American states 
with other states in the UNODC shows their willingness to tackle issues such as 
transnational organized crime and drug and weapons smuggling, which is a problem 
throughout the region. The present situation in Latin America is one of moderate stability 
with no imminent risk of collapse. In fact, the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean site, in there 2013 Economic Outlook, “that after nearly a decade of 
continuous expansion, interrupted only in 2009, the most recent projections indicate 
                                                 























growth [in Latin America] of 3.2% in 2012 and 4.0% in 2013.282 With all available data 
considered, the current situation in Latin America is moderately stable and is worth U.S. 
investment, economically and politically. The current encumbering drug policies have 
undoubtedly had an effect on the situation in Latin America; a change in policy now can 
unleash the full potential of the region. The majority of Latin American states are by no 
means, rising centers of economic power; this section simply accentuates the fact that 
throughout the scourge of the drug war, Latin America has endured.  
By removing current obstacles to their development, the U.S. may be able to help 
bring the majority of Latin America into modernity. One must note that one of the 
positive aspects of current policies is the military-to-military relations, carried out by 
Southern Command, that have acted as a positive team building experience between the 
U.S. and several Latin American nations. Therefore, at this point the current economic 
ties to and willingness from the Latin American region to conduct international security 
interoperability operations and collaboration on various economic and social platforms 
presents a inimitable opportunity for the development of an equal-partner relationship 
between the U.S. and the Latin American States.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
Authors Marvin McGuire and Steven Carroll wrote a thesis in 2002 that used 
intensive statistics and economic formulas to calculate the total cost of current prohibitive 
policies. They calculate that in 1999, the total loss of potential revenue in the U.S. was 
$186.4 billion, with inflation, that amounts to over $261.4 billion today.283 McGuire and 
Carroll explain, “For free market advocates, this represents the epitome of social 
inefficiency and public policy failure.”284 They believe the U.S. market will recoup and 
capture funds currently used to combat the supply-side drug war and funds from indirect 
costs such as criminal justice expenses, healthcare, and productivity losses, if the 
                                                 
282 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development /Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Latin American Economic Outlook 2013: SME Policies for Structural Change, 
2013, accessed January 24, 2013, http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/5/48385/LEO2013_ing.pdf, 16. 
283 Inflation Calculator, “US Inflation Calculator,” accessed May 16, 2014, 
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/. 
284 McGuire and Carroll, “Economics of the Drug War,” 79.   
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government legalized certain drugs. An influx of $261.4 billion would certainly stimulate 
the U.S. economy, and similar markets in Latin America would enable greater 
development there than ever seen before.285 
That said, as mentioned above, reasons for resistance to change are many. Most 
will agree that the drug war is expensive, damaging, and ineffective. Nonetheless, failure 
is not adequate; arguments and empirics illustrating drug policy impotence will not result 
in policy change. Author Renee Scherlen explains, “Understanding the causes of the drug 
war persistence is essential for the design of a victorious termination strategy.”286 Public 
opinion on the entire spectrum of the drug culture and the consequences of policy change 
are the two most important factors contributing to the drug policy persistence. The way 
the drug war is framed is an essential element of prospect theory outcomes.287 Presently, 
there is a low probability of policy termination; therefore, the public and its political 
representatives prefer the status quo to possible risks from policy change. If public 
perception over the drug war shifts the possibility for drug policy change increases. There 
are unknown risks involved with drug policy change; we have been conducting supply 
side antidrug efforts for over 40 years. If we continue along the present drug policy 
course the U.S. and Latin America will continue to suffer economic and societal losses 
with no possible victory in the war on drugs. It is time the public and politicians awaken 
to this fact; the more the members of the public are educated to the losses incurred 
because of current drug policies the more likely they are to accept risk. They will be 
prepared to pursue drug policy change.288  
Scherlen explicates another method, policy makers could “offer an alternative 
policy as a “sure bet.” The result would be to place perceptions of policy change into the 
                                                 
285 Ibid. 
286 Renee Scherlen, “The Never-ending Drug War: Obstacles to Drug War Policy Termination,” 
Political Science & Politics 45, no. 1 (2012): 72, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096511001739. 
287 A theory that people value gains and losses differently and, as such, will base decisions on 
perceived gains rather than perceived losses. Thus, if a person were given two equal choices, one expressed 
in terms of possible gains and the other in possible losses, people would choose the former. Also known as 
“loss-aversion theory.” Investopedia, s.v. “Prospect Theory,” accessed May 6, 2014, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/prospecttheory.asp.  
288 Scherlen, “Never-ending Drug War,” 72. 
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gains domain. Again, this would lead to greater support for policy change.”289 If the 
government assures the public of the positive benefits of a drug policy change, then it 
will be more likely to accept it. Therefore, if policy makers choose to seek change they 
must highlight prospective gains new drug policies will bring such as tax revenue and 
crime reduction, while stressing current losses such as 40 years of failure, the fall in illicit 
drugs prices while their purity continues to rise, and the increases of violence and 
corruption throughout the U.S. and Latin America. Following this strategy may be 
effective. The correct framing of an issue will make politicians more risk acceptant, more 
willing to admit current drug policy failures and perhaps do something about it.290 
On a personal note, the author of this thesis is a Christian and a republican, born 
and raised. This author believes that most drug use is morally wrong and is harmful to 
one’s self and the community. That said, after 18 months of studying the intricacies, 
diversity, and uniqueness of Latin America, this author believes that current U.S. 
domestic drug policies are doing more harm than good in the U.S., and especially in Latin 
America. Even simply as a means to reduce drug use in the end, to reduce associated 
violence and crime, and to eliminate profitability of drug trafficking organizations, policy 
change will be well worth it. Policy change can also mean a boost to the American 
economy, or funding for development programs, domestic and foreign. While there is no 
perfect solution to the global drug problem, current tactics and policy seem to make 
societal situations throughout the Americas more unstable, making higher quality drugs 
available to a wider swath of people, lining the pockets of drug trafficking organizations 
around the world, and inhibiting development where populations need it most.  
A U.S. shift towards decriminalization and legalization will also increase U.S. 
soft power in Latin America.291 The leverage that such a policy change can provide 
would perhaps receive a positive reaction when used in Latin America. The U.S. must 
prepare for a policy change; its vast antidrug infrastructure and institutions will need to 
                                                 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid. 
291 A persuasive approach to international relations, typically involving the use of economic or 
cultural influence., Oxford Dictionaries, s.v., “Soft Power,” 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/soft-power.  
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adjust their roles. The U.S. military and counterdrug agencies alike will endeavor to 
ensure their individual survival; their participation is instrumental to a smooth transition 
of U.S. drug policy as a whole. U.S. agencies knowledge and resources can fast track 
alternative policies, helping ensure policy success. Therefore, congressional and 
department leaders must deal with any obstinacy issues within the U.S. military and other 
agency resultant from the current drug policy stagnation prior to any policy change. It is 
appropriate to conclude with a few words of wisdom from Albert Einstein, who once 
concisely defined insanity as “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting 
different results.”292 The U.S. should consider trying something other than historically 
ineffectual drug policies to make headway in the global drug epidemic. 
 
                                                 
292 Albert Einstein, as quoted in in Michael F. Walther, Insanity: Four Decades of U.S. Counterdrug 
Strategy (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Press, 2012), 1. 
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